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I. INTRODUCTION 
For as long as corporations have existed, debates have per-
sisted among scholars, judges, and policymakers regarding how 
best to describe their form and function as a positive matter, and 
how best to organize relations among their various stakeholders 
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Harwell Wells, and seminar participants at the University of Cambridge Faculty of Law, 
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as a normative matter.1 This is hardly surprising given the 
economic and political stakes involved with control over vast and 
growing “corporate” resources,2 and it has become commonplace 
to speak of various approaches to corporate law in decidedly 
political terms. In particular, on the fundamentally normative 
issue of the aims to which corporate decision-making ought to be 
directed, shareholder-centric conceptions of the corporation have 
long been described as politically right-leaning while stakeholder-
oriented conceptions have conversely been described as politically 
left-leaning.3 When the frame of reference for this normative 
debate shifts away from state corporate law, however, a curious 
reversal occurs. Notably, when the debate shifts to federal 
political and judicial contexts, one often finds actors associated 
with the political left championing expansion of shareholders’ 
corporate governance powers, and those associated with the 
political right advancing more stakeholder-centric conceptions of 
the corporation.4 
 
 1. See generally Christopher M. Bruner, The Enduring Ambivalence of Corporate Law, 59 
ALA. L. REV. 1385 (2008) [hereinafter Bruner, Enduring Ambivalence]. 
 2. See Christopher M. Bruner, The Corporation’s Intrinsic Attributes, in UNDER-
STANDING THE COMPANY: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND THEORY 60, 77–81 (Barnali 
Choudhury & Martin Petrin eds., 2017). 
 3. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Community and Statism: A Conservative Contract-
arian Critique of Progressive Corporate Law Scholarship, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 856, 857–58 (1997) 
(reviewing PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995)) (describing “the 
debate between conservative contractarianism and progressive communitarianism”). 
 4. See, e.g., Christopher M. Bruner, Conceptions of Corporate Purpose in Post-Crisis 
Financial Firms, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 527, 553–60 (2013) [hereinafter Bruner, Conceptions of 
Corporate Purpose] (describing post-crisis federal corporate governance reforms, cham-
pioned by the left, that favored shareholders); Richard Marens, Waiting for the North to Rise: 
Revisiting Barber and Rifkin After a Generation of Union Financial Activism in the U.S., 52 J. BUS. 
ETHICS 109, 113 (2004) (observing that some unions that had promoted takeover defenses 
under state corporate law nevertheless supported shareholder resolutions through federal 
securities regulation that “included reducing barriers to potential takeovers”); Brett H. 
McDonnell, The Liberal Case for Hobby Lobby, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 777, 778–80 (2015) (arguing 
that, in its 2014 Hobby Lobby decision, the Supreme Court’s “conservative majority” 
described the corporation in terms that “closely resemble the picture drawn by progressive 
corporate law scholars”); Leo E. Strine, Jr. & Nicholas Walter, Conservative Collision Course?: 
The Tension Between Conservative Corporate Law Theory and Citizens United, 100 CORNELL L. 
REV. 335, 337–40 (2015) (arguing that, in its 2010 Citizens United decision, the Supreme 
Court’s “five more conservative judges” premised their decision on “certain assump-
tions . . . about corporations and their investors [that] are inconsistent with conservative 
corporate theory”). 
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The aim of this article is to explain this disconnect and explore 
its implications for the development of U.S. corporate governance, 
with particular reference to the varied and evolving corporate 
governance views of the political left—the side of the spectrum 
where, I argue, the more dramatic and illuminating shifts have 
occurred over recent decades and where the state/federal divide 
is more difficult to explain. A widespread and fundamental 
reorientation of the Democratic Party toward decidedly centrist 
national politics fundamentally altered the role of corporate 
governance and related issues in the project of assembling a 
competitive coalition capable of appealing to working-class and 
middle-class voters. Grappling with the legal, regulatory, and 
institutional frameworks—as well as the economic and cultural 
trends—that conditioned and incentivized this shift will prove 
critical to understanding the state/federal divide regarding what 
the “progressive” corporate governance agenda ought to be and 
how the situation might change as the Democratic Party for-
mulates responses to the November 2016 election. 
I begin with a brief terminological discussion, examining how 
various labels associated with the political left tend to be em-
ployed in relevant contexts (including “progressive,” commu-
nitarian,” “liberal,” and “center-left”), as well as varying ways of 
defining the field of “corporate governance” itself. I then provide 
an overview of “progressive” thinking about corporate gover-
nance in the context of state corporate law, contrasting those 
views with the very different perspectives associated with center-
left political actors at the federal level.5 
Based on this descriptive account, I then examine various 
legal, regulatory, and institutional frameworks, as well as impor-
tant economic and cultural trends, that have played consequential 
roles in prompting and/or exacerbating the state/federal divide.6 
These include fundamental distinctions between state corporate 
law and federal securities regulation; the differing postures of 
lawmakers in Delaware (the legal home for most U.S. public 
 
 5. See infra Part II. 
 6. See infra Part III. 
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companies7) and Washington, D.C.; the rise of institutional inves-
tors; the evolution of organized labor interests; certain unintended 
consequences of extra-corporate regulation (notably regarding 
pension management); and the Democratic Party’s sharp right-
ward shift since the late 1980s. The article closes with a brief dis-
cussion of the prospects for state/federal convergence, concluding 
that the U.S. corporate governance system (if one can properly use 
the word here) will likely remain theoretically incoherent for the 
foreseeable future due to the extraordinary range of relevant 
actors and the fundamentally divergent forces at work in the very 
different legal and political settings they inhabit.8 
II. CENTER-LEFT POLITICS AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
As a threshold matter, a coherent discussion of “progressive” 
conceptions of corporate governance in the context of state cor-
porate law, and how they contrast with approaches to these issues 
by actors associated with “center-left” politics at the national level, 
requires some comment on how these (and related) terms tend to 
be used. Accordingly, this Part begins with a brief terminological 
discussion before providing an overview of prevalent left-leaning 
approaches to these subjects in each setting. 
A. A Comment on Terminology 
Historically, the term “progressive” has been used in the 
United States, with varying degrees of specificity, to refer to 
various left-leaning political views. In the early decades of the 
twentieth century the term was associated with “Progressivism,” a 
political movement that opposed entrenched political power and 
emphasized “a political community in which civically educated 
citizens were not divided by enduring class, ethnic, or party 
conflicts, but only by temporary, well-informed disagreements on 
public issues.”9 Although “Progressives disagreed over issues like 
 
 7. See About the Division of Corporations, DELAWARE.GOV, https://corp.delaware 
.gov/aboutagency/ (last visited June 25, 2018). 
 8. See infra Parts IV–V. 
 9. Kenneth Finegold, Progressive Movement, US, in 2 THE OXFORD COMPANION TO 
AMERICAN POLITICS 236, 236 (David Coates ed., 2012). 
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business regulation,”10 the movement broadly anticipated 
stakeholder-oriented associations of the term “progressive” in the 
emphasis placed upon protecting vulnerable individuals from “the 
large institutions then forming in business and government.”11 In 
this respect, the Progressive movement helped set the stage for 
New Deal–era reforms, a major element of which involved frag-
mentation and regulation of concentrated economic and financial 
power in an effort to “save farmers and workers from the on-
slaught of capital.”12 
These broad social and political themes are reflected in con-
temporary corporate governance literature and discourse, where 
the term “progressive” refers broadly to the view that corporate 
law should exhibit direct and substantial regard for the interests 
of various constituencies and public interests—notably labor and 
the environment—and a correlative rejection of the notion that 
maximizing return to shareholders ought to trump all other 
interests.13 Along these lines, “progressive” corporate law scholars 
have been described as “loosely bound both by their rejection of 
the prevailing paradigm of the corporation as a public good 
designed exclusively for the maximization of private profit” and 
their embrace of “themes of efficiency and morality of respon-
sibility, altruism, and unity within the corporate form as well as 
between the corporation and the broader society.”14 A core ex-
pression of these commitments has involved widespread rejection 
among progressive corporate law scholars of the atomistic and 
market-based “contractarian” approach, which generally styles 
the corporation as a “nexus” of binary contracts with various 
 
 10. Id. at 236–37. 
 11. See MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF 
AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE 30 (1994). 
 12. See id. at 34–42; see also Alan Brinkley, New Deal, in 2 THE OXFORD COMPANION TO 
AMERICAN POLITICS 152, 154 (David Coates ed., 2012) (observing the New Deal’s “mobi-
lization and organization of new economic groups—most notably farmers and industrial 
workers—who would henceforth play a major role in shaping public policy”). 
 13. See D. Gordon Smith, The Dystopian Potential of Corporate Law 3, 7 (Univ. of Wisc. 
Law Sch. Legal Studies Research Paper Series Paper No. 1040, Mar. 2007), http://ssrn 
.com/abstract=976742 (responding to “progressive” corporate scholar Kent Greenfield); see 
also infra Section II.B. 
 14. PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) (inside back 
cover, “About the Book”). 
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stakeholders who deserve no more or less than their contracts 
specify.15 The progressive approach to corporate law, sometimes 
labeled “communitarian,”16 has accordingly been associated with 
public-oriented, left-leaning views, while the contractarian ap-
proach has conversely been associated with private-oriented, 
right-leaning views.17 
It is important to clarify, however, that we can, at most, speak 
in terms of general tendencies in broadly associating such views 
with the progressive left, and strict shareholder-centrism with the 
right. It has been observed, for example, that “there is a surprising 
degree of similarity between progressive communitarianism and 
the philosophical underpinnings of modern social conservatism,” 
and that “there is a particularly strong communitarian impulse 
among religious conservatives, who place great importance upon 
local communities.”18 For example, Lyman Johnson, a conservative 
 
 15. See, e.g., KENT GREENFIELD, THE FAILURE OF CORPORATE LAW: FUNDAMENTAL 
FLAWS AND PROGRESSIVE POSSIBILITIES 29–39 (2006); Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust. Contract. 
Process., in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 185, 186–87, 196–98 (Lawrence E. Mitchell 
ed., 1995). 
 16. See Peter C. Kostant, Team Production and the Progressive Corporate Law Agenda, 35 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 667, 668 (2002) (describing “progressive corporate law, many of whose 
proponents have characterized themselves, or are described by others, as communitar-
ians”); David Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 10 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 1013, 1039 (2013) 
[hereinafter Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy] (“So-called corporate law progressives or 
communitarians reject shareholder wealth maximization as a legal requirement and also on 
normative grounds.”). 
 17. See, e.g., Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 857–58 (describing “the debate between 
conservative contractarianism and progressive communitarianism”); Grant M. Hayden & 
Matthew T. Bodie, Larry from the Left: An Appreciation, 8 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 121, 122 (2014) 
(contrasting their left-leaning, “progressive” approach with Larry Ribstein’s “conservative 
law-and-economics” approach); Kostant, supra note 16, at 674–75 (describing the shared 
view “among progressives . . . that corporate law should treat public corporations as at 
least quasi-public institutions that must be viewed holistically as more than the sum of 
their privately ordered constituencies”); David Millon, Communitarianism in Corporate Law: 
Foundations and Law Reform Strategies, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 1, 7 (Lawrence E. 
Mitchell ed., 1995) [hereinafter Millon, Communitarianism] (observing contractarians’ adher-
ence to “the familiar libertarian idea that consent should be the sole basis for obligation” 
and that “[i]t is this libertarian premise that the corporate law communitarians reject”); 
Lawrence E. Mitchell, Preface, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW xiii, xiii–xiv (Lawrence E. 
Mitchell ed., 1995) (“Each of the scholars [contributing to Progressive Corporate Law] starts 
from the premise that it is no longer reasonable . . . to treat the corporation as a purely 
private mechanism . . . .”); Strine & Walter, supra note 4, at 338–40 (describing commitment 
to shareholder wealth maximization as “conservative” and the view that boards should 
have latitude to consider “the . . . interests of all constituencies” as its “rival”). 
 18. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 883. 
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communitarian, whose (positive and normative) rejection of 
shareholder wealth maximization reflects deeply held religious 
convictions,19 has productively co-authored on these topics for 
decades with his decidedly left-leaning Washington and Lee col-
league, David Millon.20 Johnson’s brand of conservatism contrasts 
starkly with the fundamentally libertarian brand animating the 
predominant and highly shareholder-centric contractarian concep-
tion of corporate law.21 Conversely, one might point to the Chief 
Justice of the Delaware Supreme Court, Leo Strine, who self-
identifies as “an unabashed New Deal Democrat,” yet who ap-
pears to favor shareholder wealth maximization as a corporate 
law rule (and believes as a positive matter that this represents 
current law). As discussed below, Strine prefers to ameliorate the 
excesses of shareholder wealth maximization through forms of 
regulation external to corporate law22—policy preferences consis-
tent with the predominant contractarian approach.23 Accordingly, 
it is important to remain mindful of the fact that the association of 
left-leaning politics with communitarianism, and the association 
of right-leaning politics with shareholder-centrism, are not 
 
 19. See, e.g., Lyman Johnson, A Role for Law and Lawyers in Educating (Christian) 
Business Managers About Corporate Purpose 30 (Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law Legal 
Studies Research Paper No. 08-22, 2008), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1260979 (“Many calls 
for socially responsible conduct, whether merely anti-contractarianism or more fully 
rendered communitarian visions, lack a compelling moral framework. For religious believ-
ers, the notion of faithfulness provides a foundation for constructing, or at least a lens for 
envisioning, a more ethical corporation.”). 
 20. See David Millon, Looking Back, Looking Forward: Personal Reflections on a Scholarly 
Career, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 699, 705–06 (2017) (“My politics are pretty far to the left 
and I have always voted as a Democrat. . . . Professor Johnson, in contrast, is a con-
servative, though not of the stripe that is ascendant today. Values like community, 
stability, institutional self-reform, and regard for others animate his opposition to policies 
that valorize shareholder wealth maximization and leave affected nonshareholders to fend 
for themselves.”). 
 21. See, e.g., id. at 706 (“Professor Johnson’s religious commitment also led him to 
reject arguments based solely on so-called free-market economics.”); Lyman P.Q. Johnson, 
Making (Corporate) Law in a Skeptical World, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 161, 169 (1992) 
(contrasting, in an analysis of Justice Lewis Powell’s opinions concerning state anti-
takeover laws, “an old-line conservatism . . . that manifests ‘a serious interest in institutions 
like the family, church, the local community, the private sector for their value as buffering 
or mediating forces and for their role in preserving a more diverse and pluralistic social 
order’” with the “libertarian ‘free market’ brand that many corporate scholars . . . believed 
robust takeover activity should both reflect and hasten along”). 
 22. See infra notes 269–70 and accompanying text. 
 23. See infra Section II.B. 
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universals. As we will see, these counter-trends may prove helpful 
in explaining certain dimensions of the state/federal divide with 
which this article is concerned.24 
In contrast with terms like “progressive” and “communitar-
ian,” which bear the foregoing substantive policy connotations in 
the corporate governance context, the term “center-left” gestures, 
at a higher level of generalization, toward a relative position on 
the left-right political spectrum. To be sure, all of these terms have 
been loosely used to refer broadly to left-leaning views at a high 
degree of generality.25 The term “center-left liberalism,” however, 
is broadly associated in the economic sphere with commitment to 
“the institutions of capitalism,” though tempered by “calls for 
regulating those institutions in the interests of fairness, the 
sustainability of the environment, and the growth and stability of 
the economy itself”—the ultimate aim being “broadly shared 
prosperity, raising up the middle class and the poor together.”26 
Consistent with these broad tendencies, political parties 
inhabiting the “center-left” neighborhood of the political spectrum 
in Western countries have generally reflected “coalitions that 
exclude the large party on the right,” while adhering to “non-
radical, non-Marxist” policies and thereby excluding the extreme 
left.27 Hallmarks of this centrist position have, in recent decades, 
included continuing ties with organized labor, yet growing skep-
ticism regarding “Keynesian fine-tuning” of the economy28—a 
complex posture with important consequences for the Democratic 
Party’s national political strategy and regulatory platform.29 
 
 24. See infra Part IV. 
 25. See, e.g., Paul Starr, Liberalism, Center-Left, in 2 THE OXFORD COMPANION TO 
AMERICAN POLITICS 68, 69 (David Coates ed., 2012) (observing that the terms “progressive” 
and “liberal” are “often used interchangeably” in political discourse regarding “the center-
left”); AL FROM, THE NEW DEMOCRATS AND THE RETURN TO POWER 113 (paperback ed. 2014) 
(with Alice McKeon) (employing the terms “center-left” and “progressive” to describe the 
Democratic Party’s rightward shift starting in the late 1980s). 
 26. Starr, supra note 25, at 68, 70, 73. 
 27. John W. Cioffi & Martin Höpner, The Political Paradox of Finance Capitalism: 
Interests, Preferences, and Center-Left Politics in Corporate Governance Reform, 34 POL. & SOC’Y 
463, 493 n.1 (2006). 
 28. JOHN W. CIOFFI, PUBLIC LAW AND PRIVATE POWER: CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 
REFORM IN THE AGE OF FINANCE CAPITALISM 35–36 (2010). 
 29. See infra Section III.F. 
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Finally, and in light of the foregoing, it is important to 
emphasize up front the relatively embracing nature of the term 
“corporate governance.” Being the product of a much broader 
range of legal, regulatory, and market structures than corporate 
law alone, corporate governance reflects the combined impacts of 
a much broader range of actors than are formally recognized 
under corporate law. “Corporate law” may be accurately de-
scribed as “the set of rules that defines the decision[-]making 
structure of corporations,”30 a definition that (at least in the United 
States) focuses exclusively on relationships among the board, 
officers, and shareholders, to the exclusion of all others—includ-
ing employees.31 By contrast, reference to “corporate governance” 
connotes a much broader array of legal and market forces and 
constraints, prompted by a much broader range of regulators, 
market actors, and constituencies. Hence John Cioffi, in a com-
parative study, speaks of corporate governance as “constituted by 
a juridical nexus of securities, company, and labor relations law 
that structurally allocates power among managers, shareholders, 
and employees within the corporation.”32 He adds that, as a 
political matter, “these groups are the most important protago-
nists” and that conflicts among them will ultimately be “resolved 
by state actors in widely varying ways that reflect the configura-
tion of interests and allocation of power within the broader 
political economy.”33 In the United States, this means that even 
though corporate law may itself remain a product of state politics, 
a given corporate governance issue may nevertheless be ad-
dressed through national politics, where very different power 
 
 30. Smith, supra note 13, at 4. 
 31. See Matthew T. Bodie, Employees and the Boundaries of the Corporation, in RESEARCH 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF CORPORATE LAW 85 (Claire A. Hill & Brett H. McDonnell 
eds., 2012) (observing the irony that employees are irrelevant to U.S. corporate law yet 
central to the Coasian economic conception of the firm); see also Dalia Tsuk, Corporations 
Without Labor: The Politics of Progressive Corporate Law, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1861, 1897 (2003) 
(describing reliance on collective bargaining agreements as the locus for addressing U.S. 
workers’ interests); Andrew Pendleton & Howard Gospel, Corporate Governance and Labor, 
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 634, 637 (Mike Wright et al. eds., 
2013) (describing the U.S. and U.K. perspective that “the best way for labor to be involved 
in governance was via a system of pluralism and opposition, based on trade unions and 
collective bargaining”). 
 32. CIOFFI, supra note 28, at 38. 
 33. Id. 
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relations unfold in very different political fora,34 giving rise to 
very different coalitional possibilities—which may well turn on 
the interests and incentives of organized labor.35 This in turn 
means that, notwithstanding the narrow focus of U.S. corporate 
law, a full account of U.S. corporate governance requires grap-
pling directly with labor’s interests and incentives—something of 
a moving target over recent decades, due in part to the labor 
force’s growing stake in corporate equities.36  
B. The “Progressive” State Corporate Governance Agenda 
With the foregoing terminological clarifications in mind, the 
policy agendas that have come to be associated with “progressive” 
corporate law at the state level, and “center-left” corporate 
governance at the federal level, can be set out with greater specifi-
city. A decidedly “progressive” corporate law agenda emerged in 
the late 1980s and early 1990s as a response to what were regarded 
as troubling developments in the market and in academia—the 
advent of hostile takeovers, and the law and economics-inspired37 
“nexus of contracts” theory of corporate law. A number of scholars 
began insisting on a more relational conception of the corporation 
and corporate law that has prompted a range of stakeholder-
oriented theoretical approaches. These theories differ in their 
positive descriptions of corporate law, as well as their normative 
 
 34. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware and Washington as Corporate Lawmakers, 34 DEL. J. 
CORP. L. 1, 11 (2009) [hereinafter Roe, Delaware and Washington as Corporate Lawmakers]. 
 35. See CIOFFI, supra note 28, at 31–32; Thibault Darcillon, Corporate Governance 
Reforms and Political Partisanship: An Empirical Analysis, in 16 OECD Countries, 17 BUS. & 
POL. 661, 662 (2015); Pendleton & Gospel, supra note 31, at 634. 
 36. See, e.g., Pendleton & Gospel, supra note 31, at 642–43, 650 (observing that em-
ployees may have various forms of direct or indirect involvement in corporate governance 
via employee stock ownership plans and pensions); see also infra Sections III.D–E. 
 37. While clearly a reflection of the “law and economics” (L&E) movement, see 
Bruner, Enduring Ambivalence, supra note 1, at 1397, one cannot assume that all L&E schol-
ars fully accept the nexus theory’s claims. Indeed, some have rejected it outright as a de-
scriptive theory. See, e.g., Hayden & Bodie, supra note 17, at 136 (citing Henry Hansmann 
and Michael Klausner in this respect); Michael Klausner, The “Corporate Contract” Today 30 
(Stanford Law and Economics Olin Working Paper No. 490, 2016), http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=2761463 (“The primary question is whether the contractarian theory is a valid 
positive theory of corporate governance. The answer to that question is no.”). Others, 
meanwhile, have rejected the nexus theory’s descriptive claims in the corporate context 
while accepting them in noncorporate settings. See, e.g., Hayden & Bodie, supra note 17, at 
128 (citing Larry Ribstein in this respect). 
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prescriptions regarding how corporate governance ought to be 
structured, but they share a common distaste for the nexus theory’s 
claim that shareholder wealth maximization represents the sole 
legitimate aim of corporate decision-making. 
The nexus theory conceptualizes the corporation as a legal 
nexus through which various stakeholders come together to 
pursue corporate production, advancing the mixed positive and 
normative claim that even if literal negotiation never occurs, 
corporate law ought to, and generally does, approximate what the 
relevant stakeholders would rationally have agreed to had they in 
fact done so.38 Shareholders, on this account, are by default the 
ultimate beneficiaries of board decision-making because rational 
equity investors, knowing that they hold a residual claim (i.e., that 
they receive a return on their investment only after fixed claim-
ants are paid), would—in a hypothetical negotiation—demand the 
right to elect the corporation’s directors and fiduciary duties 
compelling those directors to focus on the shareholders’ inter-
ests.39 The interests of other stakeholders such as employees, and 
“social” concerns such as environmental preservation, are by 
contrast thought to be more efficiently dealt with by contract 
and/or through extra-corporate regulation (that is, regulation 
external to corporate law). Employees, on this account, are 
assumed to be fully capable of bargaining for contractual protec-
tions in addition to those made generally available through labor 
and employment law, while environmental harms are assumed to 
be susceptible to containment through regulations, ensuring that 
corporations absorb the cost of externalities (e.g., pollution) aris-
ing from the corporation’s pursuit of business.40 
There is unquestionably considerable extra-corporate reg-
ulation that impacts employees’ relationships with corporate 
 
 38. See FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
CORPORATE LAW 14–15 (1991). 
 39. See id. at 36–39, 92–93. 
 40. See id. at 36–39. For additional discussion of the nexus conception of the 
corporation, see CHRISTOPHER M. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW 
WORLD: THE POLITICAL FOUNDATIONS OF SHAREHOLDER POWER 53–57 (2013) [hereinafter 
BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD]; Bruner, Enduring 
Ambivalence, supra note 1, at 1397–401. 
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employers41 and corporations’ incentives regarding environmental 
harms.42 Progressive corporate scholars have, however, expressed 
considerable skepticism regarding the notion that employees 
could be expected to effectively negotiate and enforce sufficient 
protections, and that environmental and other externalities can be 
sufficiently contained through extra-corporate regulation. This has 
led these scholars to conclude that the corporate governance sys-
tem itself must permit some capacity to pursue aims not tethered 
to shareholder wealth maximization.43 Labor vulnerabilities and 
interests have loomed particularly large in this respect. Indeed, as 
David Millon has observed, the “communitarian turn in corporate 
law” that emerged in the late 1980s and early 1990s arose out of 
“concern about the harm to nonshareholders that can occur as a 
result of managerial adherence to the shareholder primacy 
principle,” and particularly the “problem of nonshareholder vul-
nerability [that] emerged starkly during the hostile takeover 
explosion of the 1980s.”44 
In this light, it has been suggested with some justice that 
progressive (or communitarian) corporate law scholars are above 
all else “united by what they oppose,”45 and progressive scholars 
 
 41. See generally Bodie, supra note 31 (discussing the significance of the employer-
employee relationship in agency law, intellectual property law, tax law, and of course 
employment law). 
 42. See, e.g., Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability 
Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675 (2012). 
 43. See, e.g., GREENFIELD, supra note 15, at 14–19; David Millon, Communitarians, 
Contractarians, and the Crisis in Corporate Law, 50 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1373, 1381–86 (1993) 
[hereinafter Millon, Communitarians]; see also Matthew T. Bodie, Income Inequality and 
Corporate Structure, 45 STETSON L. REV. 69, 70 (2015) [hereinafter, Bodie, Income Inequality] 
(“[E]fforts to protect workers through labor and employment laws are insufficient to ad-
dress the underlying power imbalances within the corporate structure.”); Leo E. Strine, Jr., 
Toward Common Sense and Common Ground? Reflections on the Shared Interests of Managers and 
Labor in a More Rational System of Corporate Governance, 33 J. CORP. L. 1, 9–10 (2007) [here-
inafter Strine, Toward Common Sense] (arguing that growing competition from countries 
with lax labor and environmental regulation has heightened investors’ demand for “cost-
cutting measures,” destabilizing the U.S. balance between corporate governance and extra-
corporate regulation). 
 44. Millon, Communitarianism, supra note 17, at 1–2; see also Deborah A. DeMott, Trust 
and Tension Within Corporations, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 1308, 1308–09 (1996) (reviewing 
PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995)); Millon, Communitarians, 
supra note 43, at 1373–76. 
 45. Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 857; see also DeMott, supra note 44, at 1313 (“Disagree-
ment with the contractual characterization is an explicit or implicit starting point for 
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themselves have acknowledged the importance of developing a 
positive alternative agenda defined by something more than 
rejection of the nexus conception of the corporation and the 
associated focus on shareholder wealth maximization.46 Coherent 
theories with a progressive political orientation have, to be sure, 
been articulated—most noteworthy among them being the “team 
production” conception, styling the board as a “mediating 
hierarch” charged with inducing all stakeholders to make firm-
specific investments in the company, and accordingly remaining 
beholden to none of them.47 Notwithstanding team production 
theory’s clear rejection of shareholder wealth maximization as the 
corporation’s singular purpose,48 however, it bears emphasizing 
that team production is far from a fully developed “progressive” 
theory. Indeed, Margaret Blair and Lynn Stout style team 
production theory as a variant of nexus theory that differs from 
other such approaches, mainly in its rejection of the notion that 
 
several of the contributions to Progressive Corporate Law.”); cf. Carl Landauer, Beyond the 
Law and Economics Style: Advancing Corporate Law in an Era of Downsizing and Corporate 
Engineering, 84 CAL. L. REV. 1693, 1694, 1701, 1708 (1996) (reviewing PROGRESSIVE COR-
PORATE LAW (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995) and MARK J. ROE, STRONG MANAGERS, WEAK 
OWNERS: THE POLITICAL ROOTS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE FINANCE (1994)) (critiquing 
contributions to the Progressive Corporate Law volume for themselves being so heavily 
infused and preoccupied with law-and-economics concepts). 
 46. See, e.g., Kent Greenfield, Sticking the Landing: Making the Most of the “Stakeholder 
Moment,” 2015 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 147, 148 (2015) (“[T]hose academics advocating for the 
downfall of the shareholder primacy model, this author included, have had difficulty fully 
theorizing an alternative approach to corporate governance.”); Millon, Communitarians, 
supra note 43, at 1387 (conceding, in 1993, that “[t]hose who say that communitarians have 
not yet articulated a fully developed alternative agenda are correct”); David Millon, 
Shareholder Social Responsibility, 36 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 911, 923 (2013) [hereinafter Millon, 
Shareholder Social Responsibility] (similarly observing, in 2013, that “the stakeholder 
approach to [corporate social responsibility] has value primarily because it rejects the 
narrow notion of corporate purpose that would focus first and foremost on shareholder 
wealth maximization”); see also J. William Callison, Seeking an Angle of Repose in U.S. 
Business Organization Law: Fiduciary Duty Themes and Observations, 77 U. PITT. L. REV. 441, 
446–47 (2016) (“Although there have been attempts to develop a communitarian, some-
times termed ‘progressive,’ approach to business organization law, at this time, such an 
approach has not been fully developed.”). 
 47. See Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law, 
85 VA. L. REV. 247, 269–81 (1999). For additional discussion of the team production 
conception of the corporation, see BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW 
WORLD, supra note 40, at 57–60; Bruner, Enduring Ambivalence, supra note 1, at 1401–05. 
 48. See BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD, supra note 
40, at 58; Kostant, supra note 16, at 672. 
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shareholders represent the sole category of residual claimants, 
prompting depiction of the corporation as a “nexus of firm-
specific investments” by a broader array of critical stakeholders.49 
While corporate law does, as a practical matter, give boards sub-
stantial latitude to attend to the interests of non-shareholders—a 
straightforward consequence of the business judgment rule50—
and while such broad discretion is critical to the “mediating hier-
arch” conception of the board, team production theory, as such, 
does not call for enhanced accountability to non-shareholders 
along the lines often favored by progressive scholars.51 
One way in which progressive corporate scholars clearly have 
distinguished themselves from contractarians is in their insistent 
focus on the political and distributive dimensions of corporate 
law and corporate governance—and particularly their scrutiny 
of the underlying social and economic conditions that render 
market-based bargaining an insufficient means of protection.52 
These competing visions reflect “strongly conflicting political 
visions of the appropriate foundations of corporate law.”53 
Whereas “the communitarian project openly addresses political 
questions and demands judgments that contractarians often seem 
to believe . . . to be avoidable,” contractarians by and large “sim-
ply do not bother to speak about it in those terms.”54 Indeed, “the 
scientific pretensions of the ‘law and economics’ movement” have 
 
 49. See Blair & Stout, supra note 47, at 253–54, 262–65, 275, 285, 314 n.178, 319–20. 
 50. See BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD, supra note 
40, at 58; Blair & Stout, supra note 47, at 299–309; Einer Elhauge, Sacrificing Corporate Profits 
in the Public Interest, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 733 (2005). 
 51. See Blair & Stout, supra note 47, at 254, 319–28; see also David Millon, New Game 
Plan or Business as Usual? A Critique of the Team Production Model of Corporate Law, 86 VA. L. 
REV. 1001, 1022 (2000) (observing of team production theory that the absence of any 
stakeholder-oriented mandate permits boards so minded “to pursue shareholder value 
with relentless disregard for social costs”); infra note 63 (discussing predominant progres-
sive reform proposals). 
 52. See Millon, Communitarianism, supra note 17, at 7–9. As Stephen Bainbridge has 
observed, “there is a surprising degree of similarity between progressive communitarian-
ism and the philosophical underpinnings of modern social conservatism”—notably the 
“great importance [placed] upon local communities and other mediating institutions.” The 
two camps disagree fundamentally, however, as Bainbridge observes, regarding “the 
proper role of the state.” Bainbridge, supra note 3, at 883–85; see also id. at 885–90 (exploring 
what he terms the “essentially statist nature of the progressive agenda”). 
 53. Millon, Communitarians, supra note 43, at 1377. 
 54. Id. at 1387. 
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encouraged a tendency among scholars in this tradition to 
presume that corporate law in the United States and elsewhere 
will ultimately converge on consistent and (presumptively) opti-
mal regulatory responses to broadly similar corporate governance 
challenges, as if by a sort of apolitical natural law.55 
To be sure, progressive scholars have differed markedly in 
their descriptive accounts of how contemporary corporate law 
addresses these fundamental matters—particularly with respect to 
Delaware, the predominant jurisdiction of incorporation for U.S. 
public companies.56 While states that have adopted so-called 
“constituency statutes,” giving boards of directors broad latitude 
to take account of non-shareholder interests in corporate decision-
making, would appear straightforwardly to have adopted a more 
progressive conception of corporate purpose,57 Delaware has not 
adopted such a statute,58 fueling some controversy regarding 
where Delaware falls on this theoretical and political continuum. 
The Delaware statute provides no clear definition of corporate 
purpose, and likewise provides no clear answers regarding who 
prevails in predictable collisions of board and shareholder gover-
nance powers, leaving these matters to Delaware’s courts—a 
pattern discernible both in the hostile takeover battles of the 1980s 
and 1990s, as well as the shareholder bylaw battles raising 
fundamentally similar issues today.59 Some progressive corporate 
 
 55. See BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD, supra note 40, 
at 6, 112–15 (describing these tendencies in the comparative corporate governance context). 
 56. See supra note 7. 
 57. See McDonnell, supra note 4, at 794 (“[O]ver half of the states have adopted a 
corporate constituency statute, which explicitly allows directors to consider the interests of 
enumerated stakeholders. Although a cramped reading of these statutes is conceivable, it 
seems pretty clear that in these states the stakeholder conception has triumphed.”); see also 
BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD, supra note 40, at 44. 
 58. See Leo E. Strine, Jr., The Dangers of Denial: The Need for a Clear-Eyed Understanding 
of the Power and Accountability Structure Established by the Delaware General Corporation Law, 
50 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 762, 780–81 (2015) [hereinafter Strine, The Dangers of Denial]. 
 59. See BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD, supra note 
40, at 42–52, 172–73; see also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(a)(3) (providing that it suffices for 
the charter to state that “the purpose of the corporation is to engage in any lawful act or 
activity”), 109(b), 141(a) (giving shareholders unilateral authority to enact bylaws 
regarding the “rights or powers” of shareholders and directors, yet giving boards of 
directors plenary authority to manage the “business and affairs” of the corporation, with 
no reconciling principle), 203 (imposing modest limits on “[b]usiness combinations with 
interested stockholders,” but providing no general guidance regarding takeovers) (2018). In 
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scholars, as well as jurists who self-identify as leaning toward the 
political left, have concluded that Delaware embraces shareholder 
wealth maximization as the corporation’s defining aim, through 
preferential treatment afforded shareholders under the statute 
(e.g., the power to elect directors), as a beneficiary of direct fidu-
ciary duties, and through the courts’ requirement that stock price 
be maximized in a sale or break-up of the company.60 Others, 
myself included, have emphasized that Delaware case law 
permits substantial management discretion to show regard for 
non-shareholder interests, that shareholder wealth maximization 
remains unenforceable beyond a narrow range of final-period 
scenarios (that arise only when the board so decides), and that the 
governance powers afforded to shareholders under the Delaware 
statute are remarkably weak in comparison with those afforded 
to their counterparts in other common-law jurisdictions.61 I have 
described these realities elsewhere as expressions of 
fundamental “ambivalence” regarding “the locus of ultimate 
 
just a handful of areas, the Delaware legislature has clarified the appropriate reach of 
shareholder-enacted bylaws. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 112 (permitting bylaws enabling 
shareholders to advance their own board nominees through the company’s proxy 
statement), 115 (prohibiting bylaws that “prohibit bringing [internal corporate] claims in 
the courts of this State”), 216 (insulating from board amendment or repeal a “bylaw 
amendment adopted by stockholders which specifies the votes that shall be necessary for 
the election of directors”) (2016). 
 60. See generally, e.g., Strine, The Dangers of Denial, supra note 58 (expressing 
sympathy toward “center-left” views while arguing that “stockholder welfare [is] the sole 
end of corporate governance” under Delaware law); David G. Yosifon, The Law of Corporate 
Purpose, 10 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 181 (2014) (identifying with “progressive” scholars 
normatively while arguing that Delaware law embraces “shareholder primacy”); see also 
GREENFIELD, supra note 15, at 22 (arguing that those describing corporate law as embracing 
“shareholder supremacy” are, in terms of “pure description, . . . more right than wrong”); 
Greenfield, supra note 46, at 147–48 (reporting “significant pushback against the 
shareholder primacy norm” while arguing that “accounts of [its] imminent death . . . 
are exaggerated”). 
 61. See, e.g., BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD, supra 
note 40, at 36–65; LYNN STOUT, THE SHAREHOLDER VALUE MYTH 24–32 (2012); Bruner, 
Enduring Ambivalence, supra note 1, at 1408–27; Elhauge, supra note 50; Kostant, supra note 
16, at 683; Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life and Cor-
porate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865, 898–903, 909–17 (1990); Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, 
supra note 16, at 1014, 1022–25, 1043–44. Tellingly, those who locate strong-form commit-
ment to shareholder wealth maximization in Delaware law acknowledge that such a rule 
(assuming it exists) is effectively unenforceable, and that the handful of judicial expressions 
of commitment to such a conception of corporate purpose cite no authority. See Strine, The 
Dangers of Denial, supra note 58, at 772–77; Yosifon, supra note 60, at 190–94, 223–24. 
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corporate governance authority, the intended beneficiaries of 
corporate production, and the relationship between corporate law 
and the achievement of the social good.”62 
The critical point for present purposes, however, is simply the 
broadly shared normative commitment among self-identified 
“progressives” to the notion that the interests of non-shareholders, 
and issues not tethered to maximizing shareholder return, should 
be regarded as legitimate ends of corporate decision-making.63 
This, as the following section explores, sharply distinguishes the 
posture of progressive corporate scholars focusing on state-level 
corporate law from the posture of actors associated with the 
“center-left” at the federal level, whom one might have expected 
to represent the progressive corporate scholars’ natural allies. 
 
 62. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD, supra note 40, 
at 37; Bruner, Enduring Ambivalence, supra note 1, at 1386. Though not couched in political 
terms, others have developed the intriguing argument that corporate law must maintain 
some degree of ambiguity regarding corporate purpose in order for a singular duty of 
loyalty to apply to heterogeneous directors. See generally Martin Gelter & Genviève Hel-
leringer, Lift Not the Painted Veil! To Whom Are Directors’ Duties Really Owed?, 2015 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 1069 (2015); see also OptimisCorp v. Waite, No. 523, 2015, 2016 WL 2585871, *1, *3 (Del. 
Apr. 25, 2016) (Strine, C.J.) (expressing commitment to collaborative decision-making by 
the entire board and correlative skepticism regarding “board factions”).  
 63. See Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, supra note 16, at 1013; see also Yosifon, 
supra note 60, at 184 (arguing that “shareholder primacy is indeed the law,” while 
advocating “broader responsibilities on corporate boards”). As Kent Greenfield observes, 
the policy positions “most routinely discussed by ‘progressive’ corporate law scholars” 
include “relaxing the profit maximization norm, extending management’s fiduciary duty to 
include workers, and requiring some kind of worker representation on boards of direc-
tors.” GREENFIELD, supra note 15, at 154; see also Bodie, Income Inequality, supra note 43, at 
84–89 (advocating employee involvement in corporate governance); Greenfield, supra note 
46, at 150–60 (advocating stakeholder-oriented fiduciary duties, stakeholder board 
representation, and greater board diversity); Marleen A. O’Connor, Promoting Economic 
Justice in Plant Closings: Exploring the Fiduciary/Contract Law Distinction to Enforce Implicit 
Employment Agreements, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 219, 228–30 (Lawrence E. Mitchell 
ed., 1995) (arguing that fiduciary duties should be owed to both shareholders and 
employees); cf. Strine, The Dangers of Denial, supra note 58, at 767–68, 786–93 (arguing that if 
non-shareholders are to be protected within corporate law they should be given 
“enforceable rights,” but that strong “externality regulation” would be preferable). It must 
be acknowledged, however, that progressive scholars are hardly unanimous regarding the 
viability of such reforms. See, e.g., Millon, Communitarianism, supra note 17, at 11–22 
(arguing that “the multifiduciary approach” remains “vague,” while implicit contract 
theory remains similarly “indeterminate” and susceptible to disclaimer); see also DeMott, 
supra note 44, at 1322–25 (agreeing with Millon). 
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C. The “Center-Left” Federal Corporate Governance Agenda 
In stark contrast with the stakeholder-oriented agenda asso-
ciated with “progressives” at the level of state corporate law, 
various political groups, who one might have assumed would 
share their views, have in fact pursued agendas at the federal level 
that flatly contradict the views described above.64 The Democratic 
Party and important constituencies thereof—notably, organized 
labor—have strongly favored corporate governance reforms pre-
mised on views that corporate law progressives categorically re-
ject, including the notion that shareholder wealth maximization 
represents the defining aim of the corporation and the appropriate 
metric for director and officer decision-making. 
Traditionally, the process of incorporation and the develop-
ment of corporate law governing relations among a corporation’s 
directors, officers, and shareholders has been left to the states 
under an unusual choice-of-law rule called the “internal affairs 
doctrine.”65 It is critical to recognize, however, that Congress 
retains unquestioned plenary power to federalize corporate law 
as, and when, it likes under the Commerce Clause of the U.S. 
Constitution.66 While efforts to federalize corporate law outright 
arose at various points in the twentieth century, those initiatives 
were not successful.67 Federal corporate governance initiatives 
enacted over the last several decades have tended to be sporadic 
and crisis-driven—a pattern reflected in the creation of federal 
securities regulation and the Securities and Exchange Commission 
 
 64. Cf. Greenfield, supra note 46, at 147–49 (describing the “tension” between pro-
gressives “who seek to emphasize ‘shareholder activism’ to further progressive ends and 
those who want to defeat shareholder primacy by a greater emphasis on managerial discre-
tion and autonomy”). 
 65. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 89 (1987); Santa Fe Indus., 
Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 479 (1977); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS 
§§ 302(2), 304 (1971). 
 66. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (giving Congress authority to “regulate Commerce 
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”); see also 
Leo E. Strine, Jr., Breaking the Corporate Governance Logjam in Washington: Some Constructive 
Thoughts on a Responsible Path Forward, 63 BUS. LAW. 1079, 1084 (2008) (“No substantial 
argument can be made that Congress does not have the constitutional authority to enact a 
preemptive corporate law governing publicly traded corporations operating in inter-
state commerce.”). 
 67. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588, 597 (2003) [herein-
after Roe, Delaware’s Competition]. 
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(SEC) in the early 1930s following the stock market crash and 
ensuing “Great Depression,” and then more recently in the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act following the Enron and WorldCom bank-
ruptcies, and the Dodd-Frank Act following the financial crisis.68 
Critically, for present purposes, each of these reform initiatives 
was championed by Democrats. 
The creation of federal securities regulation was, the SEC 
explains, “designed to restore investor confidence in [U.S.] capital 
markets by providing investors and the markets with more 
reliable information and clear rules of honest dealing.”69 In this 
light, it is hardly surprising that the SEC’s institutional disposition 
would be to maintain a heavy focus on capital providers; the 
SEC’s mission is, in the Commission’s words, “to protect invest-
ors, maintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets, and facilitate 
capital formation.”70 The federal securities regime, and the SEC 
itself, represent one of numerous federal reforms enacted under 
the administration of Democratic President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt, who appointed Joseph Kennedy—father of a later 
 
 68. See, e.g., Christopher M. Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of Crisis, 36 J. 
CORP. L. 309, 332–35 (2011) [hereinafter Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of Crisis]; 
Christopher M. Bruner, Managing Corporate Federalism: The Least-Bad Approach to the Shareholder 
Bylaw Debate, 36 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 26–29 (2011) [hereinafter Bruner, Managing Corporate 
Federalism]; Roe, Delaware and Washington as Corporate Lawmakers, supra note 34, at 7–12; Roe, 
Delaware’s Competition, supra note 67, at 591–93. This is not to suggest, however, that securities 
reforms occur exclusively in response to crises. See generally Usha R. Rodrigues, Dictation and 
Delegation in Securities Regulation, 92 IND. L.J. 435 (2017) (arguing that the crisis-based 
account of securities reform is incomplete, and that private industry favors prescriptive 
legislation minimizing agency interference in non-crisis contexts to directly operationalize 
their deregulatory preferences, yet favors delegation to agencies following crises to maxi-
mize opportunities to prevent restrictive regulation from materializing). 
 69. What We Do, U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, https://www.sec 
.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last modified June 10, 2013); see also Bruner, Managing 
Corporate Federalism, supra note 68, at 43 (observing that, with respect to corporate 
governance debates, “the SEC is effectively a single-constituency regulator”); Cioffi & 
Höpner, supra note 27, at 484 (observing “the Democrats’ historical support for the 
regulatory state,” evidenced by the fact that “the New Deal of the 1930s created modern 
securities regulation”). To observe that the SEC’s mission is “to protect investors” is not, 
however, to say that the SEC invariably achieves this aim. See, e.g., Renae Merle, Despite 
Travails, White Calls SEC ‘Aggressive and Successful,” WASH. POST (May 27, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/on-leadership/wp/2016/05/27/despite-travails 
-white-calls-sec-aggressive-and-successful/?utm_term=.b56a45faa8c5 (reporting “complaints” 
about the SEC, including that “the agency has not been tough enough on Wall Street” and 
has historically been “a slow and toothless tiger”). 
 70. What We Do, supra note 69. 
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Democratic President, John F. Kennedy—to serve as the SEC’s 
first chairman.71 
Over recent decades, the gulf between the SEC’s shareholder-
centric focus and greater regard for other stakeholders under 
state-level corporate law has come fully into focus. As of the early 
1990s, state takeover law increasingly suggested that “the 
appropriate balance among shareholder and nonshareholder 
interests . . . can no longer be resolved by a facile bow in the 
direction of shareholder primacy,” yet at the same time, the SEC, 
“pursuing its usual single constituency agenda, . . . revised its 
proxy rules to encourage institutional shareholder activism . . . .”72 
While Republicans did achieve limited victories during the years 
of the Clinton administration in passing “securities litigation 
reform legislation designed to reduce the incidence of securities 
litigation”73—including “the only successful override of a 
presidential veto during Clinton’s two terms in office”74—the 
trend in federal policymaking during the Clinton years strongly 
favored shareholders. 
Since the turn of the millennium, shareholder-centric corpo-
rate governance reforms at the federal level have picked up pace, 
and such reforms have uniformly emerged from the political left.75 
The collapse of Enron and other finance-driven corporate scandals 
created a real crisis of public confidence in capital markets, 
prompting greater federal willingness to intervene in public 
company corporate governance76 and permitting “reformers to 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Millon, Communitarians, supra note 43, at 1376; see also Cioffi & Höpner, supra 
note 27, at 481–82. 
 73. Cioffi & Höpner, supra note 27, at 481. 
 74. CIOFFI, supra note 28, at 105–07 (describing enactment of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995); see also H.R. 1058 (104th): Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act of 1995, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/104-1995/h839 (last 
visited June 25, 2018) (tabulating the House votes); H.R. 1058 (104th): Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act of 1995, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/104/hr1058 
(last visited June 25, 2018) (“This bill was enacted after a congressional override of the 
President’s veto on December 22, 1995.”). 
 75. See Cioffi & Höpner, supra note 27, at 482–83; Martin Gelter, The Pension System 
and the Rise of Shareholder Primacy, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 909, 949–50 (2013) [hereinafter 
Gelter, The Pension System]; Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack 
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1528, 1549–51, 1556 (2005). 
 76. CIOFFI, supra note 28, at 110–11. 
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break through the bottlenecks and veto points of politics” for a 
certain window of time.77 As Cioffi observes of this period, one 
finds “for the first time . . . the interests and perceptions of the 
investor class [being] viewed, however questionably, as largely 
coterminous with those of the citizenry at large,” with consequent 
heavy political emphasis on the “rhetoric of shareholder value.”78 
Passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002 indeed 
“represented a break with established forms of regulation and 
federalism in American corporate governance,” marking a shift 
from historically disclosure-based federal securities reforms 
toward “expanded federal regulatory authority over corporate 
accounting” and more direct regulation of the structure of the 
board of directors itself.79 Reforms included, among other things, 
a requirement that the accounting firm for a public company 
report directly to an “audit committee” consisting entirely of 
independent directors80—a shift toward federally mandated 
independence strongly reinforced by a New York Stock Exchange 
requirement that “[l]isted companies must have a majority of 
independent directors.”81 While votes on SOX’s enactment in both 
the House of Representatives and the Senate were virtually 
unanimous,82 it is well understood that SOX “was the product of a 
political struggle between Democrats using financial scandals 
against the Republicans and Republicans seeking to delay or 
dilute the legislation in keeping with their loyalty to corporate 
supporters and their antiregulation ideological policy agenda.”83 
As Cioffi observes, Republicans ultimately “sought to neutralize 
the scandals as a potent November 2002 election issue by 
 
 77. Id. at 137. 
 78. Id. at 110–16. 
 79. See id. at 97–99, 117, 119–20. 
 80. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. §§ 204, 301 (2002). 
 81. NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL § 303A.01 (last amended 
Nov. 25, 2009). 
 82. See H.R. 3763 (107th): Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, GOVTRACK, https://www.gov 
track.us/congress/votes/107-2002/h348 (last visited June 25, 2018) (tabulating the House 
votes); H.R. 3763 (107th): Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us 
/congress/votes/107-2002/s192 (last visited June 25, 2018) (tabulating the Senate votes). 
 83. CIOFFI, supra note 28, at 111–12. 
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supporting corporate governance reform and accepting only 
minor compromises from the Democrats.”84 
Following the financial crisis that emerged in 2007, Democrats 
sought numerous shareholder-focused federal reforms, achieving 
a number of them. Firms subject to the Troubled Asset Relief 
Program (TARP) faced not only pay restrictions and oversight by 
the Department of Treasury, but also “say-on-pay” votes giving 
shareholders an advisory vote on executive compensation.85 More 
ambitiously, Democratic Senator Charles Schumer of New York 
introduced a bill in May 2009 that aimed to “provide shareholders 
with enhanced authority over the nomination, election, and 
compensation of public company executives”—a raft of proposed 
reforms styled as a “Shareholder Bill of Rights.”86 Had it been 
enacted, Schumer’s Shareholder Bill of Rights Act would have 
brought with it a number of reforms strongly enhancing the 
corporate governance position of shareholders, including clear 
authority for the SEC to give shareholders greater access to the 
company’s proxy statement in order to nominate directors (an 
initiative typically referred to as “proxy access”), shareholder say-
on-pay and golden parachute votes, and exchange listing rules 
requiring independent board chairs and annual elections of 
directors by majority vote (differing markedly from the default 
plurality voting system).87 While the Shareholder Bill of Rights 
Act was not ultimately enacted, the Dodd-Frank Act, signed into 
law by President Barack Obama in July 2010, did include certain 
of these reforms. Dodd-Frank reforms favoring shareholders 
included say-on-pay and golden parachute votes, disclosure re-
quirements focusing on how executive compensation relates to the 
corporation’s performance, a three-year clawback mechanism for 
incentive-based compensation following accounting restatements, 
and clear authority for the SEC to provide enhanced proxy 
 
 84. Id. at 116; see also Romano, supra note 75, at 1564–65. 
 85. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, H.R. 1, 111th Cong. § 7001 
(2009); Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, H.R. 1424, 110th Cong. §§ 111, 
302 (2008). 
 86. Shareholder Bill of Rights Act of 2009, S. 1074, 111th Cong. pmbl., § 1 (2009). 
 87. Id. §§ 3–5. 
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access.88 Additional Dodd-Frank reforms affecting corporate 
governance included a requirement that certain larger financial 
firms have risk committees89 and additional regulation for 
incentive-based pay in certain financial firms that regulators 
conclude “could lead to material financial loss to the covered 
financial institution.”90 The Dodd-Frank Act itself was enacted 
following clear party-line votes, with almost no Republicans 
voting in favor.91 
Post-crisis reform efforts of this sort, strongly redounding to 
the benefit of shareholders, were sought by union pensions 
(among others)92—retirement funds associated with the principal 
purported beneficiaries of stakeholder-oriented “progressive” 
initiatives at the state level—and as noted, the reforms described 
above were enacted at the behest of Democrats. That shareholder-
centric corporate governance reforms would have been adopted in 
response to a crisis thought to have resulted from excessive risk-
taking is puzzling enough, given the well-understood preference 
of equity investors for greater risk-taking and the empirical 
literature’s association of shareholder-centric governance with 
poor performance in the run-up to the crisis.93 That such reforms 
 
 88. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 
111th Cong. §§ 951, 953, 954, 971 (2010). 
 89. Id. § 165(h). 
 90. Id. § 956(a)(1)(B). For additional background on these reform efforts, including 
challenges faced by regulators in operationalizing proxy access and regulation of incentive-
based pay in financial firms, see BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW 
WORLD, supra note 40, at 268–72; see also Stephen M. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank: Quack Federal 
Corporate Governance Round II, 95 MINN. L. REV. 1779, 1783, 1796–1812 (2011) [hereinafter 
Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank]. 
 91. See H.R. 4173 (111th): Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, 
GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/111-2010/h413 (last visited June 25, 
2018) (tabulating the House votes); H.R. 4173 (111th): Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act, GOVTRACK, https://www.govtrack.us/congress/votes/111-2010 
/s208 (last visited June 25, 2018) (tabulating the Senate votes). 
 92. See, e.g., Letter from Jeff Mahoney, Gen. Counsel, Council of Institutional Inv’rs, 
and others, to the Honorable Nancy Pelosi, Speaker of the House 1–2 (Dec. 2, 2008), 
http://www.ott.ct.gov/pressreleases/press2008/PR12022008.pdf. 
 93. For an overview of this literature and corporate governance reform proposals 
responding to it, see BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD, 
supra note 40, at 262–65; see also CIOFFI, supra note 28, at 206-08; Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank, 
supra note 90, at 1818–19; Adam Zurofsky, Corporations: The “Positive Discipline” Model, 
DEMOCRACY: J. IDEAS (2016), http://democracyjournal.org/magazine/41/corporations-the 
-positive-discipline-model/. 
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would be championed by the political left, however, in stark 
contrast with stakeholder-oriented “progressive” initiatives in 
state-level corporate law, is doubly surprising. Part III explores 
potential explanations for this extraordinary state/federal divide 
among the political left. 
III. EXPLAINING THE STATE/FEDERAL DIVIDE 
The disjuncture between the corporate governance policy 
preferences of the political left at the state and federal levels is 
complex indeed, though measured by reference to traditional 
political affiliations, it is the left’s preferences at the federal level 
that are more difficult to explain. As John Cioffi and Martin 
Höpner observe, one might reasonably expect that “the center-left 
should oppose, rather than support, corporate governance 
reform” that favors shareholders because the political economy 
literature “tend[s] to identify the center-left and organized labor 
as . . . hostile to shareholder interests.”94 
Undoubtedly these phenomena reflect the interaction of 
numerous political factors, and this Part canvasses a range of 
potential explanatory variables, some of which have received 
substantial attention in the U.S. corporate governance literature 
while others have received less attention. Ultimately, I acknowl-
edge that accounts emphasizing institutional and political 
distinctions between state and federal politics and regulatory 
regimes point us in the right direction, though such distinctions 
do not always in fact break the way that prior literature predicts. 
It has been suggested that constituencies such as organized labor 
have a greater voice at the federal level, though in reality such 
actors have demonstrably impacted corporate governance politics 
at the state level as well. More telling is the fact that these actors 
have themselves pursued very different courses at state and 
federal levels, often in response to legal and regulatory structures 
not traditionally regarded as central to “corporate governance.” 
This Part of the Article argues that the diametrically opposed 
normative agendas pursued by left-leaning actors at state and 
federal levels reflect the extraordinary legal, institutional, and 
 
 94. Cioffi & Höpner, supra note 27, at 464. 
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political complexities of corporate governance in the United States. 
While I acknowledge the significance of familiar distinctions 
between state corporate law and federal securities law as forms of 
regulation, and between Delaware and Washington, D.C., as sites 
of rulemaking, I argue that this normative divide among the left 
more proximately reflects structural changes in capital markets 
and the labor movement that have reinforced a fundamental 
reorientation of the Democratic Party since the mid-1980s toward 
decidedly centrist national politics. 
Several trends have prompted a center-left politics of corpo-
rate governance at the federal level bearing no relation what-
soever to the progressive agenda for corporate law at the state 
level, including a reorientation of labor unions away from tradi-
tional organizing activities and toward pension management, as 
active union membership dwindles relative to the population of 
aging pensioners; an intense focus of applicable labor regulation 
on generating returns for pensioners, including fiduciary obliga-
tions interpreted to require pensions to engage in activism aimed 
at forcing corporate managers to focus intently on maximizing 
returns to shareholders; and the increasingly centrist Democratic 
Party’s efforts to capitalize on these pro-shareholder trends by 
assembling an anti-manager “middle class” coalition of workers 
and financial institutions. These trends have fundamentally al-
tered the role of corporate governance and related issues in the 
project of assembling a competitive electoral coalition. The legal, 
economic, and cultural trends that conditioned and incentivized 
this shift are critical to understanding the state/federal divide 
regarding what the “progressive” corporate governance agenda 
ought to be. 
A. Corporate v. Securities Law 
As noted above, corporate law (including in Delaware) 
arguably remains ambivalent regarding the degree to which 
corporate governance ought to empower shareholders and focus 
narrowly on their interests,95 whereas securities regulation, 
essentially by design, reflects no such ambivalence when it comes 
 
 95. See supra notes 61–62 and accompanying text. 
01.BRUNER_FIN_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/7/18  10:01 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2018 
292 
to corporate governance—the clear aim of the regulatory regime 
and the SEC being investor protection.96 While it is undoubtedly 
true that this mission renders securities regulation’s purview 
broader in some respects than that of corporate law—
bondholders, for example, having standing to sue under the 
former regime but not the latter97—it nevertheless remains the 
case that in corporate governance debates the SEC has strongly 
favored shareholders’ interests. 
It has been argued with some force that there is a fundamental 
complementarity between securities regulation and corporate 
law—the relatively homogenous interests of investors when 
making trades prompting undifferentiated, disclosure-based 
securities regulation, whereas the more heterogeneous interests of 
investors holding stock prompt “greater flexibility and diversity” 
in corporate law.98 This notion of regulatory complementarity 
presumes that securities regulation remains a predominantly 
disclosure-based field. Yet, as we have already seen, there is 
substantial and increasing overlap between the two fields as the 
securities regime has, over recent decades, increasingly focused 
attention on core aspects of corporate governance traditionally left 
to the states.99 In addition to proxy voting—enabled by state 
corporate law, yet long regulated substantially at the federal level 
for public companies100—core elements of public company board 
structure and operations have, since the turn of the millennium, 
come to be governed by securities regulation and associated stock 
exchange rules requiring (among other things) a majority inde-
pendent board and fully independent audit and compensation 
 
 96. See supra notes 69–74 and accompanying text. 
 97. See James J. Park, Reassessing the Distinction Between Corporate and Securities Law, 
64 UCLA L. REV. 116, 154–55 (2017). 
 98. Id. at 121–22. 
 99. Park acknowledges this, framing his argument conceptually as a means of 
discerning what the line between these fields ought to be. See id. at 129–30, 157–58, 163–82; 
see also Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank, supra note 90, at 1796–812. 
 100. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 212(b) (2012) (authorizing voting by proxy in Dela-
ware corporations); 15 U.S.C. § 78n (2012) (granting the SEC authority to enact rules 
regulating the solicitation of proxies for securities issued by companies registered under 
§ 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.14a-1–240.14b-2 (2017) (Regu-
lation 14a, including SEC-enacted rules governing proxy solicitation). 
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committees.101 As the securities regime looms larger in corporate 
governance, so too does its primary constituency—shareholders. 
These dynamics are certainly relevant to explaining the 
state/federal divide with respect to degrees of shareholder-
centrism in these two fields. Such dynamics do not, however, shed 
light in any clear way on the specific question that this article 
addresses—the divide between left-leaning voices at state and 
federal levels with respect to fundamental corporate governance 
policy preferences. As noted above, straightforward party affil-
iations would lead one to expect the left to adopt positions at the 
federal level resembling those we have encountered in “pro-
gressive” accounts of corporate law at the state level,102 yet we 
find exactly the opposite. This political divide requires a more 
complete explanation. 
B. Delaware v. Washington, D.C. 
As opposed to focusing on the nature of state and federal legal 
regimes themselves, some accounts focus on the institutional 
settings in which they are produced. Notably, Mark Roe has ex-
plored at length the competitive dynamics between Delaware, the 
principal site for production of U.S. corporate law as a matter of 
custom and market practice, and Washington, D.C., the locus of 
ultimate constitutional competence in the field. Observing that no 
other states meaningfully compete with Delaware for cross-border 
incorporations,103 Roe has forcefully argued that Washington, 
D.C.—per the Commerce Clause—represents Delaware’s true 
competition in the production of corporate law.104 
Critically for the present inquiry, D.C. represents a very 
different institutional setting, bringing different inputs to bear 
 
 101. See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 
111th Cong. § 952 (2010) (requiring a fully independent compensation committee); 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. § 301 (2002) (requiring a fully indepen-
dent audit committee); NEW YORK STOCK EXCHANGE LISTED COMPANY MANUAL, supra note 
81, § 303A.01 (last amended Nov. 25, 2009) (requiring a majority independent board). 
 102. See supra note 94 and accompanying text. 
 103. See Roe, Delaware and Washington as Corporate Lawmakers, supra note 34, at 5–6; see 
also Bruner, Managing Corporate Federalism, supra note 68, at 27–28. 
 104. See Roe, Delaware’s Competition, supra note 67, at 591–93, 596–97, 600–06, 632–33; 
see also Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491 (2005) [hereinafter Roe, 
Delaware’s Politics]. 
01.BRUNER_FIN_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/7/18  10:01 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2018 
294 
upon the policymaking process. In his account of Delaware’s 
corporate lawmaking position, Roe observes that, whereas the 
“general polity is not usually involved directly in Delaware, even 
though the corporation affects parties beyond managers and 
investors,” in D.C. “the range of interests with the clout to 
influence policy widens beyond just investors and managers”—
for example, labor and “public interest lobbying groups.”105 
Instances in which the federal corporate governance machinery 
has been operationalized have tended to be “sudden, episodic, 
and crisis-driven,”106 with reform efforts responding to public 
attention and “populist anger.”107 Roe identifies various circum-
stances in which Delaware is more likely to be overcome by D.C., 
observing that “Congress sets aside Delaware-based, quasi-
private lawmaking when the media reveals gross corporate 
wrongdoing or when poor national economic performance is 
plausibly tied to corporate governance.”108 
Roe’s account is a conceptually rich one, identifying important 
federal institutional features that undoubtedly affect how and 
when Delaware can act on its own. Distinctions regarding which 
actors tend to be operative at each level of government do not, 
however, resolve the question addressed here, because we have 
an identifiable political left at both state and federal levels who do 
not behave consistently—including particular sets of actors who 
have, themselves, taken inconsistent positions in the two settings. 
For example, as discussed further below, organized labor support-
ed the enactment of so-called “constituency” statutes in response 
to hostile takeovers109 yet has also supported shareholder-centric 
 
 105. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, supra note 104, at 2499–504; see also Bainbridge, Dodd-
Frank, supra note 90, at 1784–85. 
 106. CIOFFI, supra note 28, at 137. 
 107. Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank, supra note 90, at 1786–87; see also Bruner, Conceptions of 
Corporate Purpose, supra note 4, at 553–60. 
 108. See Roe, Delaware’s Politics, supra note 104, at 2529; see also Bainbridge, Dodd-
Frank, supra note 90, at 1815–19 (advancing a similar critique of Dodd-Frank reforms); 
Romano, supra note 75, at 1525–29, 1563, 1566 (arguing that a crisis context facilitated 
adoption of SOX reforms, unrelated to Enron’s problems, that “policy entrepreneurs” 
sought for other reasons). 
 109. See Mark J. Roe, Capital Markets and Financial Politics: Preferences and Institutions, 
in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 79, 83 (Mike Wright et al. eds., 
2013) (observing that the AFL-CIO supported adoption of Pennsylvania’s anti-takeover 
law); cf. Lynne L. Dallas, Working Toward a New Paradigm, in PROGRESSIVE CORPORATE LAW 
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corporate governance reform efforts at the federal level—
including initiatives aimed at reducing barriers to hostile take-
overs.110 Accordingly, a full explanation of the divide regarding 
corporate governance among left-leaning actors at state and fed-
eral levels will require some account of the perceived interests of 
labor, in particular, as they are formulated in different settings 
and at different times. 
C. The Rise of Institutions 
In addition to substantive dimensions of the relevant legal 
fields and institutional dimensions of the relevant state and 
federal regulatory fora, important market developments have 
affected the manner in which various actors conceptualize and 
pursue their interests. Among such market developments, the rise 
of institutional investors has substantially impacted the salience of 
shareholder interests in political and market discourse. 
For decades, it has been commonplace to describe the U.S. 
public company as reflecting a “separation of ownership and 
control,” with widely dispersed minority stockholders remaining 
entirely passive, and accordingly permitting corporate power to 
default entirely to the board of directors and appointed officers.111 
At least from the 1930s, large corporations “were seen as auto-
nomous entities governed by a professional, managerial class[,]” 
and “progressive” scholars placed great emphasis on their 
capacities to satisfice various constituencies.112 Peter Gourevitch 
and James Shinn describe these middle decades of the twentieth 
century as reflecting “an American version of the corporatist 
compromise.” During this period, corporate governance “was part 
 
35, 52 (Lawrence E. Mitchell ed., 1995); Roe, Delaware and Washington as Corporate Lawmak-
ers, supra note 34, at 25–26. 
 110. See infra Sections III.D–E. 
 111. ADOLPH A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND 
PRIVATE PROPERTY 5–7 (Transaction Publishers 2010) (1932). 
 112. Tsuk, supra note 31, at 1899–900, 1903–04. Nobel Prize–winning economist 
Herbert Simon coined the term “satisficing” to describe pursuit of what is “good enough,” 
in contrast with seeking to maximize. As applied to organizational managers, Simon wrote 
that “Whereas economic man maximizes, selects the best alternative from among all those 
available to him, . . . his cousin, administrative man, satisfices, looks for a course of action 
that is satisfactory or ‘good enough’.” See Herbert Simon, ECONOMIST (Mar. 20, 2009), 
http://www.economist.com/node/13350892 (quoting Simon). 
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and parcel” of the post–New Deal economic and regulatory 
environment and was largely “produced by the coalition that 
supported it: farmers and landowners, labor, industries of many 
kinds seeking help, thus another burst of populism mixed with 
owner interests that wanted a regulated economy.”113 By the 
1970s, however, the market began to shift in favor of large, and 
increasingly assertive, institutional investors.114 Today they are 
decidedly “the dominant players” in capital markets, with insti-
tutions, including pensions, investment companies (e.g., mutual 
funds), insurers, university endowments, and bank trust depart-
ments collectively holding “approximately three-fourths of the 
1,000 largest U.S. corporations and around 70% of the shares of all 
U.S. corporations.”115 Such institutions have substantially re-
concentrated the otherwise dispersed shareholdings that typified 
public company stock ownership through much of the twentieth 
century. Accordingly, shareholders in this institutional form no 
longer remain passive bystanders—a market reality fostering the 
emergence of effective advocates for the enhancement of share-
holder-centrism, bringing extraordinary market power to bear 
upon corporate governance.116 
This greater capacity for, and predilection toward, activism 
has included reinvigorated use of shareholders’ voting power, 
both directly and through proxy advisors. It is critical to observe, 
however, that this re-concentration of voting power has effectively 
empowered professional managers, not the actual beneficial 
investors in their funds, creating what now–Chief Justice of the 
Delaware Supreme Court Leo Strine has called a “separation of 
ownership from ownership.”117 This is potentially problematic 
because the underlying beneficial investors often save for long-
term goals, such as retirement or the education of their children, 
 
 113. PETER A. GOUREVITCH & JAMES SHINN, POLITICAL POWER AND CORPORATE 
CONTROL: THE NEW GLOBAL POLITICS OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 245–46 (2005). 
 114. See Tsuk, supra note 31, at 1899–900, 1903–04. 
 115. Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, supra note 46, at 913 (footnote omitted). 
 116. See Tsuk, supra note 31, at 1903–09. 
 117. Strine, Toward Common Sense, supra note 43, at 15. 
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yet the institutions hired to help them achieve these goals often 
face “pressure to generate short-term results.”118 
The market pressures resulting from institutions’ short-term 
time horizon, and greater capacity to enforce more shareholder-
centric corporate management, have led David Millon to dis-
tinguish between the “traditional” shareholder primacy model, 
preserving a high degree of board discretion to focus on the long-
term and to temper profit maximization, and a new “radical” 
shareholder primacy model focusing primarily on quarterly 
earnings and styling the board as a mere agent of the shareholders 
(economically, if not legally)—a model drawing power from 
Chicago-school law and economics scholarship.119 While there 
may be “no legal authority for the radical shareholder primacy” 
model, it most assuredly reflects a powerful phenomenon of 
market culture, and understanding its roots in market and legal 
pressures exerted upon the institutions themselves is critical to 
developing a full account of the role of shareholders in modern 
corporate governance.120 It is also critical to understanding why 
left-leaning actors, including labor unions, have sought very 
different things in state and federal settings—a complex matter 
addressed in the remainder of Part III of the Article. 
D. The Evolution of Organized Labor Interests 
The power base, the interests, and even the identity of organi-
zed labor in the United States have evolved substantially over 
recent decades, and understanding why actors associated with 
organized labor have increasingly supported—and indeed vocally 
advocated—shareholder-centric federal corporate governance re-
forms requires an account of these changes. As this section 
 
 118. See id. at 10. Strine’s account is broadly consistent with the “financialization” 
literature, which has explored “the intensification of pressures on managers to prioritize 
what are ostensibly ‘owner’ interests in the light of changes in investor composition and 
behavior,” while emphasizing that “financial intermediaries” themselves have increasingly 
marginalized both corporate managers and the “ordinary investors” who the institutions 
ostensibly represent. See Geoffrey Wood & Mike Wright, An Age of Corporate Governance 
Failure? Financialization and Its Limits, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE GOVER-
NANCE 703, 703 (Mike Wright et al. eds., 2013). 
 119. See generally Millon, Radical Shareholder Primacy, supra note 16. 
 120. Id. at 1034–42. 
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explains, there are essentially two dimensions to this—the rise of 
union-sponsored pensions as prominent institutional investors and 
the fall of union organizations themselves as labor representatives. 
Since the 1970s, “defined benefit” pensions, under which 
employers are obligated to meet a certain payout level and bear 
investment risk to meet that obligation, have increasingly given 
way to “defined contribution” pensions (such as 401(k) and 403(b) 
plans), under which employers’ sole obligation is to provide the 
promised contributions. Critically, defined contribution plans 
place the investment risk associated with meeting a desired 
payout level on the employees themselves.121 According to a 
report of the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, 
from 1977 to 2007, “the number of participants in defined con-
tribution plans increased 358 percent (from 14.6 million to 66.9 
million workers) compared to a 31 percent decrease in defined 
benefit plan . . . participants (from 28.1 million workers to 19.4 
million workers).”122 Whereas 65.8 percent of workers with 
employer-sponsored retirement plans in 1977 had defined benefit 
plans, by 1997 “the percentages had completely reversed,” with 
67.8 percent then having defined contribution plans.123 By 2007, 
77.5 percent had defined contribution plans.124 
This shift has effectively turned a large swathe of American 
working families into investors, partially merging employee and 
investor identities in public discourse. As Martin Gelter has 
observed, in a defined contribution plan, “an employee is a 
shareholder, namely either a diversified investor in the capital 
market or in his own employer through an ESOP” (an employee 
stock ownership plan)—a shift that naturally tends to predispose 
employees themselves to look more favorably upon shareholder-
 
 121. See TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., NO. 2010-10-097, STATISTICAL 
TRENDS IN RETIREMENT PLANS 2, 5–8 (Aug. 9, 2010); Gelter, The Pension System, supra note 
75, at 921–25. 
 122. TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., supra note 121, at 7. 
 123. Id. at 8. 
 124. Id. For additional background on these dramatic shifts, see EMP. BENEFITS SEC. 
ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, DOLOPS14D0017, PRIVATE PENSION PLAN BULLETIN 
HISTORICAL TABLES AND GRAPHS 1975–2014 (Sept. 2016). 
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centric policies.125 Interestingly, the data still confirm that “the 
shareholder class . . . retains elite characteristics.” The “modal 
shareholder” (revealed by a study of the Fed’s Survey of 
Consumer Finances and IRS data) is “rich, old, and white.”126 
These trends have, however, undeniably altered the politics of 
corporate governance and fueled the perception that various 
socioeconomic strata, notably the “middle class,” have a 
substantial stake in the capital market—and that the value of that 
stake would be materially enhanced by embrace of shareholder-
centric policies.127 
More pertinently, for purposes of understanding the state/ 
federal divide in left-leaning corporate governance preferences, 
these developments have radically altered the position of 
organized labor via their associated pensions, which manage 
substantial retirement assets and accordingly find themselves in 
the position of shareholders—a shift in posture that has been 
reinforced by attenuation of traditional union activities as union 
membership declines. “Since its peak in 1954 at approximately 
25 million workers or 39.2% of the U.S. workforce, the number of 
organized laborers has declined to 15.4 million or 12% of the U.S. 
workforce in 2006.”128 In light of these trends, with their pensions 
looming larger and their traditional organizing activities fading 
 
 125. Gelter, The Pension System, supra note 75, at 943, 946–48; see also Natalie C. Cotton 
Nessler & Gerald F. Davis, Stock Ownership, Political Beliefs, and Party Identification from the 
“Ownership Society” to the Financial Meltdown, 2 ACCT. ECON. & L. 1, 2–3 (2012). 
 126. William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, Shareholders and Social Welfare, 36 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 489, 490–91 (2013). 
 127. See BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD, supra note 
40, at 275–86; Bruner, Conceptions of Corporate Purpose, supra note 4, at 553–60; see also 
GERALD F. DAVIS, THE VANISHING AMERICAN CORPORATION: NAVIGATING THE HAZARDS OF 
A NEW ECONOMY 61–65 (2016). 
 128. Ashwini K. Agrawal, Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: 
Evidence from Proxy Voting, 25 REV. FIN. STUD. 187, 191–92 (2012); see also Megan Dunn & 
James Walker, Union Membership in the United States, Spotlight on Statistics, U.S. DEP’T LAB. 
BUREAU LAB. STAT. 1–5 (Sept. 2016), https://www.bls.gov/spotlight/2016/union-member 
ship-in-the-united-states/pdf/union-membership-in-the-united-states.pdf (reporting that 
union membership in the private sector has fallen substantially since the 1980s, and that 
“five industries accounted for 81 percent of [private sector] union members in 2015,” 
including education and health services at 1.9 million, manufacturing at 1.4 million, 
transportation and utilities at 1.1 million, construction at 940,000, and wholesale and retail 
trade at 871,000); Graham K. Wilson, American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial 
Organizations, in 1 THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN POLITICS 50, 51–52 (David Coates 
ed., 2012). 
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from their prior significance, “obtaining a good return on their 
investments for aging members became relatively more important.”129 
A substantial percentage of union pension fund assets are 
invested in U.S. stocks,130 reflecting the fact that equities are “the 
only type of investment to yield profits that are high enough ‘to 
make retirement income programs work.’”131 Indeed, the need to 
generate returns sufficient to meet current obligations represents a 
critical driver of institutional investors’ behavior more generally. 
For example, public pension plans (generally structured as 
defined benefit plans) “have historically assumed an annual rate 
of return of 8% give or take a half point” in order to fund current 
obligations—an impossibility for most since the financial crisis, 
prompting “a focus on short-term stock price performance” and 
“high turnover rates.”132 Similar challenges face employer-
sponsored pensions (particularly those that remain defined ben-
efit plans), as well as other forms of institutional investors.133 
Naturally, these practical realities condition policy prefer-
ences, and there are certainly areas in which shareholders and 
workers easily find common cause. Workers might join share-
holders in favoring greater transparency as a means of ensuring 
job security (e.g., by promoting better accounting and reducing 
managerial “moral hazard”) and constraining executive compen-
sation “widely perceived as excessive by shareholders and 
workers alike.”134 Predictably, workers become more likely to 
align with such a “transparency coalition” when their “financial 
 
 129. Gelter, The Pension System, supra note 75, at 956; see also Bratton & Wachter, supra 
note 126, at 513–14; Eugene Scalia, The New Labor Activism, WALL STREET J., Jan. 23, 2008, 
at A24. 
 130. See Agrawal, supra note 128, at 192 (“Approximately 46% of all union pension 
assets are invested in domestic equities as of September 30, 2006.”). 
 131. Gelter, The Pension System, supra note 75, at 928. 
 132. Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, supra note 46, at 930–32. 
 133. See id. at 933–34; see also PYRAMIS GLOBAL ADVISORS, US TAFT-HARTLEY (UNION): 
MOVING FORWARD DESPITE UNCERTAINTY 4 (Leadership Series: 2013 Pyramis US Taft-
Hartley (Union) Pulse Poll, 2013) (“Generating greater risk-adjusted returns may be one of 
the only viable ways for Taft-Hartley [defined benefit] plans to grow their assets.”); 
TREASURY INSPECTOR GEN. FOR TAX ADMIN., supra note 121, at 5, 12–13 (observing that 
many defined benefit plans are underfunded). 
 134. GOUREVITCH & SHINN, supra note 113, at 209. 
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share increases,” as straightforwardly occurs when pension assets 
are invested in stocks.135 
There has been considerable debate regarding whether, in fact, 
advocacy efforts by union pensions have been truly focused on 
maximizing shareholder wealth, or rather have tended to advance 
labor interests (for example, by targeting companies with labor 
problems).136 To date, the empirical literature on union pension 
fund incentives, and the effects of their advocacy, remains 
mixed.137 One study found that “AFL-CIO-affiliated shareholders 
become significantly less opposed to directors once the AFL-CIO 
labor organization no longer represents a firm’s workers”—a 
pattern differing from other forms of institutional investors138 and 
straightforwardly in tension with legal obligations imposed upon 
pension fund management under federal law.139 Others, however, 
examining the impact of “labor union-sponsored shareholder 
proposals” on various shareholder and labor interests, generally 
find no “observable patterns,” although there are limited circum-
stances where union proposals appear to have consequentially 
advanced shareholder interests, or to have increased unionization 
rates, respectively.140 
Accordingly, it appears that union pension fund activism 
could plausibly advance shareholder interests, or worker/union 
interests, as the case may be—and these mixed findings may 
 
 135. Darcillon, supra note 35, at 667–68; see also Bratton & Wachter, supra note 126, 
at 513–14. 
 136. See, e.g., Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank, supra note 90, at 1816–17 (“[U]nion and state 
and local pension funds are precisely the shareholders most likely to use their positions to 
self-deal . . . or to otherwise reap private benefits not shared with other investors.”); Scalia, 
supra note 129 (describing, in 2008, “a reported AFL-CIO plan to promote shareholder 
proposals that press companies to offer more generous employee health-care benefits”). 
 137. See, e.g., Agrawal, supra note 128, at 189; Jay B. Kesten, Shareholder Political 
Primacy, 10 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 161, 201–03 (2016); Andrew K. Prevost et al., Labor Unions as 
Shareholder Activists: Champions or Detractors?, 47 FIN. REV. 327, 330 (2012). 
 138. Agrawal, supra note 128, at 187; see also David F. Larcker & Brian Tayan, Union 
Activism: Do Union Pension Funds Act Solely in the Interest of Beneficiaries? 2–3 (Stanford 
Closer Look Series, 2012). 
 139. See infra Section III.E. 
 140. Prevost et al., supra note 137, at 327, 342–44 (“[M]ajority support of proposals 
interact to produce more independent boards following targeting with a statistically 
stronger effect within the unionized portion of the sample. . . . Targets that have no initial 
union presence show a significant increase in unionization over the following three years 
following targeting.”). 
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simply illustrate the contradictory position in which unions and 
their associated pension funds have found themselves over recent 
decades.141 As Richard Marens has described,  
[O]rganized labor has explored ways to use its capital as a tool to 
create new union jobs, back unionized companies with 
investment funds, set up “worker-owner councils” in a few cities 
to discuss issues with local corporations, and establish mutual 
funds that channeled union pension plans toward worker-
friendly public corporations.142  
He concludes, however, that “it is difficult to claim that these 
efforts have done a great deal for organized labor in the United 
States,” given substantial drops in wages and unionization 
rates,143 and that in fact “labor’s financial activism has . . . done 
more for capital than it has . . . accomplished for labor.”144 
Following a period of limited, and often labor-oriented, 
activism in the 1970s and early 1980s, union pension fund 
activism began to change fundamentally in the mid-1980s follow-
ing alignment with the Council of Institutional Investors, which 
strongly emphasized corporate governance reform. “Organized 
labor had never before promoted governance reform, which has 
typically included reducing barriers to potential takeovers,” 
Marens writes, even though some unions had “assisted companies 
in establishing legal barriers to takeovers during the height of the 
frenzy in the 1980s, for fear of downsizing or union busting by the 
raider.”145 In the early 1990s, then, foreign investments “posed an 
 
 141. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbolic Corporate Governance Politics, 94 
B.U. L. REV. 1997, 2000, 2040–41 (2014) (describing a union shareholder proposal to redeem 
a poison pill); Prevost et al., supra note 137, at 328 (“[T]he dual role of labor unions as 
collective bargaining agents and as stewards of their members’ pension funds means that 
they are fraught with an inherent conflict of interest.”); Pendleton & Gospel, supra note 31, 
at 645–46, 649–51 (observing that short-termism among pension funds breeds short-
termism among corporate management, and that increased shareholder-centrism leads to 
lower worker pay and potentially discourages collective bargaining). 
 142. Marens, supra note 4, at 109. 
 143. Id. at 117–18. 
 144. Id. at 110. 
 145. Id. at 113; see also, History, COUNCIL INSTITUTIONAL INV., http://www.cii.org 
/cii_history (last visited June 25, 2018) [hereinafter COUNCIL INSTITUTIONAL INV.] (“Our 
voting membership has grown to more than 125 public, union and corporate employee 
benefit plans, endowments and foundations with combined assets that exceed 
$3.5 trillion.”); Prevost et al., supra note 137, at 333–35 (finding that a “common theme 
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especially sharp conflict for the labor funds,” as union 
organizations themselves had no interest in “subsidizing the loss 
of American jobs,” yet their pension funds naturally sought strong 
returns—including abroad—in order to support benefits pay-
ments.146 Overall, however, the “effort and resources they have 
expended on behalf of organized labor have made it legally and 
organizationally easier for shareholders to communicate, orga-
nize, put forward proposals, and compel management to change 
its behavior.”147 
E. Unintended Regulatory Consequences in External Regulation 
It is important to observe that the mere fact of conflicting 
incentives does not explain why an actor’s behavior would break 
in one or the other direction. Understanding why organized 
labor’s activism has tended so heavily to favor the empowerment 
and interests of shareholders at the federal level—in stark contrast 
with their impact, and the traditional conceptualization of their 
interests, at the level of state corporate law—requires some 
account of the legal rules and other constraints within which 
union pension funds operate. 
As with many complex phenomena involving the interaction 
of regulatory constraints and market forces, there is plenty of 
room for the law of unintended consequences to operate—and 
that is all the more true at the federal level, where policymakers 
have to address a much broader array of issues involving a much 
broader array of constituencies.148 At least two such instances 
have arisen at the federal level with the unintended consequence 
of substantially bolstering the degree of shareholder-centrism 
prevailing in U.S. corporate governance, one involving tax and the 
other—perhaps ironically—involving labor regulation intended to 
protect workers. 
 
addressed by union-sponsored shareholder proposals is the elimination of antitakeover 
devices” and that such proposals “met with the greatest degree of success,” particularly 
those addressing poison pills). 
 146. Allen R. Myerson, Labor Unions Flex Pension Muscle, N.Y. TIMES, May 23, 1993, § 3, 
at 15. 
 147. Marens, supra note 4, at 120. 
 148. Cf. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, supra note 104, at 2499–504. 
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On the tax side, in response to perceived excesses in the 
compensation of public company executives, Congress amended 
the Internal Revenue Code in 1993 to provide that compensation 
beyond $1 million would be deductible for the corporation (as a 
business expense) only if performance based.149 The result, how-
ever, was not the desired reduction in executive compensation but 
rather an explosion in the equity-based component of executives’ 
overall compensation packages. This strongly skewed manage-
ment incentives in large public companies toward a narrow focus 
on stock price, which in turn (among other things) is thought to 
have contributed to the climate of excessive risk-taking that led to 
the recent financial crisis.150 
The other such instance of unintended regulatory conse-
quences, which is directly pertinent to the political questions 
addressed here, stems from the Employee Retirement Income 
Security Act (ERISA),151 a federal law enacted in 1974 to ensure 
responsible management of pension assets in private employer-
sponsored retirement funds. “ERISA imposed more severe 
regulatory burdens on [defined-benefit] plans than [defined-
contribution] plans,” creating a substantial skew toward defined-
contribution plans and undermining the bonding effect between 
labor and management that defined-benefit plans had forged.152 
Additionally, ERISA imposed fiduciary duties upon plan manag-
ers153 that have virtually required them not only to focus intently 
on maximizing returns to the plan as corporate shareholders but 
to engage in strong-form activism to enhance the overall degree of 
shareholder-centrism prevailing in U.S. corporateµ governance. 
 
 149. See BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD, supra note 
40, at 173–74. 
 150. For additional background, see Bruner, Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of 
Crisis, supra note 68, at 316–17. Note that the recently enacted “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act” has 
“remove[d] the exception . . . for qualified performance-based compensation, making it 
subject to the $1 million deduction limit for taxable years commencing after Dec. 31, 2017.” 
Joseph E. Bachelder III, Executive Pay at Public Corporations After Code §162(m) Changes, N.Y. 
L.J. (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.law.com/newyorklawjournal/2018/03/22/executive 
-pay-at-public-corporations-after-code-%C2%A7162m-changes/. 
 151. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001–1461 (2018). 
 152. Gelter, The Pension System, supra note 75, at 929–32 (observing that defined-
benefit plans incentivized labor to remain with their employer and, to the degree under-
funded, deterred “driving a very hard bargain”). 
 153. Id. at 956. 
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ERISA requires pension fund fiduciaries to manage employ-
ees’ retirement assets prudently and loyally, which, in this 
context, has been taken to require a single-minded focus on 
generating returns to pay benefits to pension beneficiaries. “Em-
ployee welfare benefit plans” and “employee pension benefit 
plans”154 are required to maintain “a written instrument” that 
“shall provide for one or more named fiduciaries who jointly or 
severally shall have authority to control and manage the operation 
and administration of the plan,” which authority may be dele-
gated to “an investment manager or managers to manage 
(including the power to acquire and dispose of) any assets of a 
plan.”155 Plan management, then, is subject to fiduciary duties 
spelled out in the statute. Notably, a plan fiduciary “shall 
discharge his duties with respect to a plan solely in the interests of 
the participants and beneficiaries” and “for the exclusive purpose 
of . . . providing benefits to participants and their beneficiaries.”156 
In other words, the statute requires strict loyalty to plan 
beneficiaries, an obligation that has come to be understood to 
require intense focus on maximizing plan assets, as described 
below. Additionally, a plan fiduciary must act “with the care, 
skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstances then 
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and 
familiar with such matters would use in the conduct of an 
enterprise of a like character and with like aims.”157 This 
specifically includes “diversifying the investments of the plan so 
as to minimize the risk of large losses” (unless prudence dictates 
otherwise).158 Such fiduciaries must also act “in accordance with 
the documents and instruments governing the plan.”159 These 
provisions essentially impose duties of care, loyalty, and 
obedience similar to those arising in other fiduciary contexts. 
Consistent with the foregoing, ERISA expressly prohibits various 
forms of transactions that straightforwardly involve conflicts of 
 
 154. See 29 U.S.C. § 1002(1)–(3) (2012). 
 155. Id. § 1102(a)(1), (c)(3). 
 156. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(A)(i) (emphasis added). 
 157. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(B). 
 158. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(C). 
 159. Id. § 1104(a)(1)(D). 
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interest, including “use by or for the benefit of, a party in interest, 
of any assets of the plan”160—a provision that would appear 
straightforwardly to preclude voting securities held by the plan 
for the benefit of anyone other than beneficiaries. Fiduciaries who 
breach these duties  
shall be personally liable to make good to such plan any loss-
es . . . and to restore to such plan any profits of such fiduciary 
which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the 
fiduciary, and shall be subject to such other equitable or reme-
dial relief as the court may deem appropriate.161 
An interesting—and certainly ironic—consequence of the 
intense focus on maximizing plan assets mandated by ERISA’s 
fiduciary duties is that interpretations of these statutory require-
ments promulgated by the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) over 
the years have been among the most consequential, and highly 
shareholder-centric, regulatory documents affecting corporate 
governance to have arisen in any U.S. legal setting. The DOL has 
stated in an interpretive bulletin that the “fiduciary act of 
managing plan assets that are shares of corporate stock includes 
the voting of proxies appurtenant to those shares of stock”162—a 
position virtually requiring active engagement by pension plans 
as shareholders of the companies in which they invest. 
Accordingly, it is unsurprising that there was a spike in “labor-
sponsored resolutions that reached a vote” following adoption of 
this policy position in the 1990s.163 In exercising such voting 
powers, then, the DOL interpretive bulletin essentially requires 
intense focus on profit maximization. The DOL explains that 
ERISA’s fiduciary duties 
require that, in voting proxies, the responsible fiduciary consider 
those factors that may affect the value of the plan’s investment 
and not subordinate the interests of the participants and beneficiaries in 
their retirement income to unrelated objectives. . . . The named 
 
 160. Id. § 1106(a)(1)(D). 
 161. Id. § 1109(a). 
 162. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.2016-01(1) (2017) (“Interpretive bulletin relating to the exercise of 
shareholder rights and written statements of investment policy, including proxy voting 
policies or guidelines.”); see also Larcker & Tayan, supra note 138, at 1. 
 163. Marens, supra note 4, at 113–14. 
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fiduciary must carry out this responsibility solely in the interests 
of the participants and beneficiaries and without regard to its 
relationship to the plan sponsor.164 
The categorical nature of this injunction bears emphasizing: the 
DOL underscores that ERISA fiduciary duties “require” focus on 
investment value and that the fiduciary cannot “subordinate” 
investment value to “unrelated objectives.” 
The impact of the DOL’s statement goes further, however, 
effectively requiring active pursuit of greater shareholder-
centrism in corporate governance. The DOL interprets ERISA’s 
fiduciary duties not merely to require engaged proxy voting 
focusing on “the value of the plan’s investment” but affirmative 
shareholder activism.165 In the same interpretive bulletin, the DOL 
endorses “maintenance . . . of a statement of investment policy” as 
“consistent with the fiduciary obligations set forth in ERISA[,]”166 
a signal strongly suggesting that the DOL would look askance at 
failure to maintain such a statement. The bulletin elaborates, then, 
that “a statement of proxy voting policy would be an important 
part of any comprehensive statement of investment policy”167 and 
indicates that an 
investment policy that contemplates activities intended to 
monitor or influence the management of corporations in which 
the plan owns stock is consistent with a fiduciary’s obligations 
under ERISA where the responsible fiduciary concludes that 
there is a reasonable expectation that such monitoring or 
communication with management . . . is likely to enhance the 
value of the plan’s investment.168 
Lest the significance of this quasi-injunction be lost on plan 
fiduciaries,169 in another passage worth quoting at length, the DOL 
identifies governance-related topics upon which plan fiduciaries 
 
 164. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.2016-01(1) (emphasis added). 
 165. Id. § 2509.2016-01(2). 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. § 2509.2016-01(3) (“Shareholder Engagement”). 
 169. Cf. Strine, Toward Common Sense, supra note 43, at 5–6 (suggesting that share-
holder proposals are pursued instrumentally to demonstrate compliance with ERISA 
fiduciary duties). 
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might engage, and even potential means of imposing their views, 
again with a single-minded focus on profit maximization: 
Active monitoring and communication activities would gener-
ally concern such issues as the independence and expertise of 
candidates for the corporation’s board of directors and assuring 
that the board has sufficient information to carry out its 
responsibility to monitor management. Other issues may include 
such matters as governance structures and practices, particularly 
those involving board composition, executive compensation, 
transparency and accountability in corporate decision-making, 
responsiveness to shareholders, the corporation’s policy re-
garding mergers and acquisitions, the extent of debt financing 
and capitalization, the nature of long-term business plans 
including plans on climate change preparedness and sustain-
ability, governance and compliance policies and practices for 
avoiding criminal liability and ensuring employees comply with 
applicable laws and regulations, the corporation’s workforce 
practices (e.g., investment in training to develop its work force, 
diversity, equal employment opportunity), policies and practices 
to address environmental or social factors that have an impact 
on shareholder value, and other financial and non-financial 
measures of corporate performance. Active monitoring and com-
munication may be carried out through a variety of methods including 
by means of correspondence and meetings with corporate management 
as well as by exercising the legal rights of a shareholder.170 
In no uncertain terms, the DOL’s guidance conveys to plan 
fiduciaries that the DOL expects them to engage with manage-
ment on a host of governance-related issues; that in so engaging, 
their single-minded focus is to be maximizing plan assets; and 
that considerable exertion toward this end is expected—not 
merely through “correspondence and meetings,” but potentially 
including “exercising the legal rights of a share-holder,”171 leaving 
to the imagination whether the DOL has in mind the shareholder 
franchise, shareholder proposals, lawsuits, or all of the above. 
The thrust of this guidance has hardly been lost on the 
marketplace. The interpretive bulletin described above was 
 
 170. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.2016-01(3) (emphasis added). 
 171. Id. 
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adopted in late 2016, revising prior guidance on these matters, to 
encourage further “voting [of] proxies and engaging in other 
prudent exercises of shareholder rights” (by removing any 
implication that elaborate “cost-benefit analysis” is required in all 
instances to justify such action).172 In adopting these revisions, the 
DOL stated that the “existence of financial benefits associated 
with shareholder engagement is suggested by the fact that a 
growing number of institutional investors are now engaging 
companies on [environmental, social, or governance] issues,” 
adding that “[o]ther market developments further substantiate the 
financial benefits from shareholder engagement.”173 These state-
ments underscore the DOL’s expectation of affirmative share-
holder activism by ERISA fiduciaries, prompting market observers 
to predict that “[s]hareholder activism could increase this year in 
the wake of [this] new Labor Department guidance.”174 
A related area with which the DOL has been concerned, and 
where the Department’s vacillation over time has reflected some 
ambivalence regarding the degree to which plan fiduciaries must 
act as financially driven shareholders, involves the selection of 
plan investments. The DOL has been particularly unsure how to 
handle so-called “economically targeted investments” (ETIs), 
which are “selected for the economic benefits they create apart 
from their investment return to the employee benefit plan.”175 
Whereas under Republican administrations the DOL had 
“discouraged, if not forbidden, efforts by pension funds to pursue 
social goals,” the Clinton administration “generally favor[ed] 
broader labor rights and the channeling of investments to create 
jobs.”176 An interpretive bulletin issued by the DOL in 1994 
 
 172. Interpretive Bulletin Relating to the Exercise of Shareholder Rights and Written 
Statements of Investment Policy, Including Proxy Voting Policies or Guidelines, 81 Fed. 
Reg. 95879, 95879–80 (Dec. 29, 2016) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pt. 2509) (providing 
“supplemental views” associated with DOL’s withdrawal of Interpretive Bulletin 2008-2 
and adoption of Interpretive Bulletin 2016-1, “which reinstates the language of Interpretive 
Bulletin 94-2 with certain modifications”); see also 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-2 (repealed 2016). 
 173. Interpretive Bulletin, supra note 172, at 95881. 
 174. See Michael Greene, DOL Guidance Sparking Corporate Fears of More Activism in 
2017, BLOOMBERG BNA (Jan. 4, 2017). 
 175. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.2015-01 (2017) (“Interpretive bulletin relating to the fiduciary 
standard under ERISA in considering economically targeted investments.”). 
 176. Myerson, supra note 146, at 15. 
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endorsed such investments as long as they generated a 
competitive return for the plan relative to the risks involved—an 
apparent effort to square “social investing” with ERISA’s fidu-
ciary duties, which was criticized for potentially creating “inap-
propriate pressures to make such investments.”177 
In 2008, this approach was superseded by a new bulletin 
reflecting “a series of interpretive positions taken by the DOL in 
individual letters” over intervening years that effectively carved 
back at ETIs, clarifying that the cases where such investments 
would be viewed as consistent with ERISA’s fiduciary duties were 
“very limited.”178 Plan fiduciaries would have to be prepared to 
show that the ETI and available alternative investments were 
“economically indistinguishable,” meaning “truly equal, taking 
into account a quantitative and qualitative analysis of the eco-
nomic impact on the plan” before the ETI could be selected.179 This 
2008 bulletin was itself superseded in 2015,180 however, when the 
DOL apparently abandoned entirely the concept of having a 
distinct test or approach to ETIs. The new 2015 guidance simply 
directs plan fiduciaries to a previously issued regulation on 
ERISA’s prudence requirements and states that any investment 
“will not be prudent if it would be expected to provide a plan 
with a lower rate of return than available alternative investments 
with commensurate degrees of risk or is riskier than alternative 
available investments with commensurate rates of return.”181 The 
DOL here emphasizes that the “fiduciary standards applicable to 
ETIs are no different than the standards applicable to plan 
investments generally.”182 
 
 177. Edward A. Zelinsky, ETI, Phone the Department of Labor: Economically Targeted 
Investments, IB 94-1 and the Reincarnation of Industrial Policy, 16 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 
333, 347–48 (1995) (observing that “groups expecting to benefit from ETIs have strong 
incentives to compel such trustees to declare ties,” permitting investment in ETIs under the 
DOL’s 1994 formulation). 
 178. Donald P. Carleen et al., DOL Issues Economically Targeted Investment and Proxy 
Voting Guidance 1–2 (Oct. 24, 2008), http://www.friedfrank.com/siteFiles/Publications
/998D0DCCAAAE080E1ECAEA4F475A4424.pdf (quoting the 2008 interpretive bulletin). 
 179. Id. (quoting the 2008 interpretive bulletin). 
 180. See 29 C.F.R. § 2509.08-1 (repealed 2015). 
 181. 29 C.F.R. § 2509.2015-01 (2017). 
 182. Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 2550.404a-1 (2017) (“Investment duties.”). 
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In light of the foregoing, we should hardly be shocked to find 
pension fiduciaries subject to ERISA, and those advising them, 
advocating strongly shareholder-centric conceptions of corporate 
governance. This is readily apparent, for example, in proxy voting 
guidelines promulgated for union pensions. Union pension funds 
that are “affiliated with the same umbrella organization” typically 
“synchronize their proxy voting decisions by employing a third-
party fiduciary” who “cast[s] votes in consultation with the head 
officers of the umbrella labor organization under which the 
individual union funds are associated”—the “AFL-CIO Office of 
Investment” being a prominent example.183 In the AFL-CIO’s case, 
their proxy voting guidelines are expressly aimed at compliance 
with “fiduciary duties as outlined in [ERISA] and subsequent 
[DOL] policy statements,” particularly the duty of loyalty and the 
exclusive purpose rule.184 The guidelines leave little doubt that the 
AFL-CIO hears the DOL loud and clear regarding the imperative 
of focusing exclusively on maximizing plan assets and the de facto 
expectation that fiduciaries will engage in shareholder activism,185 
and “AFL-CIO union pensions funds are,” in fact, regarded as 
“some of the most involved shareholder activists.”186 While the 
guidelines express regard for the interests of “important corporate 
constituents such as . . . employees and the communities in which 
they operate,” and preserve some capacity to support “corporate 
responsibility or social issue shareholder proposals,” in both 
instances the guidelines carefully cabin such considerations by 
reference to “long-term” corporate success.187 The guidelines 
indeed express commitment to long-term decision-making 
throughout,188 blaming recent corporate scandals and the financial 
crisis on “executives [who] sacrifice[d] long-term value creation 
for short-term greed.”189 Yet the guidelines endorse numerous 
corporate governance structures that strongly empower 
 
 183. Agrawal, supra note 128, at 192–93; see also Marens, supra note 4, at 115–16. 
 184. AFL-CIO, AFL-CIO PROXY VOTING GUIDELINES: EXERCISING AUTHORITY, RESTOR-
ING ACCOUNTABILITY 1, 31–35 (2012). 
 185. See id. at 26–32, 35. 
 186. Agrawal, supra note 128, at 193. 
 187. AFL-CIO, supra note 184, at 5, 20–21. 
 188. See id. at 1, 4, 11–17. 
 189. Id. at 1. 
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shareholders190—a tendency widely associated with union 
activism, and short-termism, in the literature.191 
While state and municipal employee pension funds are 
regulated by applicable state laws, “ERISA fiduciary principles 
often are found in state law as well,”192 prompting similar 
responses. This is vividly illustrated by the California Public 
Employees’ Retirement System (CalPERS), “the nation’s largest 
public pension fund,”193 which is subject to very similar fiduciary 
duties under California state law and has adopted proxy voting 
guidelines that resemble those adopted by the AFL-CIO in 
pertinent respects.194 California’s constitution states that “the 
retirement board of a public pension or retirement system shall 
have . . . fiduciary responsibility for investment of moneys and 
administration of the system” and requires fund management “in 
a manner that will assure prompt delivery of benefits and related 
services to the participants and their beneficiaries.”195 As under 
ERISA, this provision states that plan assets “are trust funds and 
shall be held for the exclusive purposes of providing benefits to 
participants . . . and their beneficiaries.”196 Duties of loyalty and 
care resembling ERISA duties apply, including an obligation to 
manage the plan “solely in the interest of, and for the exclusive 
purposes of providing benefits to, participants and their 
beneficiaries” and to do so “with the care, skill, prudence, and 
diligence under the circumstances then prevailing that a prudent 
person acting in a like capacity and familiar with these matters 
 
 190. See id. at 3–20. 
 191. See, e.g., Agrawal, supra note 128, at 193–94 (“[L]abor union activists support 
proposals that further increase shareholder powers . . . .”); Gelter, The Pension System, supra 
note 75, at 957–58 (“[U]nion activism has to a large degree helped the cause of shareholder 
primacy.”); Pendleton & Gospel, supra note 31, at 645–46 (associating pensions’ need to 
generate “short-term returns” with short-termism in corporate governance). 
 192. AFL-CIO, supra note 184, at 23, 26. 
 193. CAL. PUB. EMPS.’ RET. SYS. (CALPERS), GLOBAL GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES 7 
(updated Mar. 14, 2016) [hereinafter CALPERS, GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES]. 
 194. While “fiduciary status and responsibilities with respect to state and local 
governmental funds are determined primarily by the states and common law of the 50 
states,” in litigation “the state courts can and do look to ERISA standards and federal court 
decisions for guidance in interpreting and applying common-law trust principles.” AFL-
CIO, supra note 184, at 26. 
 195. CAL. CONST., art. XVI, § 17 (2016). 
 196. Id. 
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would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and 
with like aims.”197 State statutes accordingly prohibit conflict 
transactions198 and reiterate the duty to manage the plan “solely in 
the interest of the participants and beneficiaries” for “the 
exclusive purpose of . . . [p]roviding benefits.”199 
As at the federal level, these requirements have predictably 
impacted CalPERS’s plan documents, which again aim first and 
foremost to ensure compliance with fiduciary duties.200 As under 
ERISA, California’s state-law fiduciary duties are interpreted to 
embrace proxy voting and various “engagement strategies,” with 
the “primary performance objective” being “long-term target risk-
adjusted return.”201 Limited capacity to consider social and 
environmental issues is squared with applicable fiduciary duties, 
principally through reference to long-term sustainability and risk-
management considerations.202 Yet once again a number of highly 
shareholder-centric corporate governance structures are advocat-
ed203—governance structures perhaps reflecting the fact that, as 
CalPERS itself emphasizes, their investments “fund around two-
thirds of [their] pension payments every year,” placing a 
particular premium on “ensuring that [their] investments . . . 
generate the highest possible returns.”204 Their discussion of 
“engagement strategies” conveys that they are more than willing 
to assert themselves in order to achieve this imperative, including 
not only “[d]irect engagement” with corporate management but 
also “director nominations, filing shareowner proposals, proxy 
 
 197. Id. 
 198. See CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 20150, 20153 (West 2017). 
 199. Id. § 20151. 
 200. See CAL. PUB. EMPS.’ RET. SYS. (CALPERS), STATEMENT OF INVESTMENT POLICY FOR 
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 1 (2015) [hereinafter CALPERS, STATEMENT OF INVESTMENT POLICY]. 
 201. Id. at 1–3; see also CALPERS, GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES, supra note 193, at 9–10. 
 202. See CALPERS, STATEMENT OF INVESTMENT POLICY, supra note 200, at 1; CALPERS, 
GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES, supra note 193, at 7, 23–26, 33–36, 41. 
 203. See CALPERS, GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES, supra note 193, at 12–20, 26–33. 
 204. Id. at 7; see also Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, supra note 46, at 930–33 
(discussing the pressures placed upon corporate managers to focus on short-term returns 
emanating from public pension funds’ current payment obligations); Pendleton & Gospel, 
supra note 31, at 645–46. 
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solicitations, director withhold vote campaigns, and strategic 
investor collaboration.”205 
F. National Party Politics 
The foregoing discussion of the evolution of organized labor’s 
interests, and how they have been impacted by regulatory 
developments in federal labor law, help explain why this critical 
stakeholder group would have come to favor decidedly share-
holder-centric corporate governance structures. This does not in 
itself, however, explain how and why such preferences have 
found such a congenial home in the national politics of the U.S. 
center-left, or how and why a larger political coalition committed 
to such views—or at least finding them a convenient component 
of a larger political platform—would have taken shape over recent 
decades. This final section of Part III takes up that question. 
As a threshold matter, it is quite striking that shareholder-
centric corporate governance reforms have—across a range of 
countries including the United States—been prompted by center-
left parties.206 This is surprising because one would expect share-
holder-centric corporate governance structures “to conflict with 
traditional left-wing political commitments to working-class and 
low-income constituencies.”207 Moreover, compelling theoretical 
work in comparative corporate governance has associated left-
leaning politics with stakeholder-oriented corporate laws and 
right-leaning politics with shareholder-oriented corporate laws.208 
Yet in cases as diverse as the United States, Germany, France, and 
Italy, Cioffi and Höpner find that over recent decades “center-left 
political parties were the driving force behind corporate 
 
 205. CALPERS, STATEMENT OF INVESTMENT POLICY, supra note 200, at 3; see also 
CALPERS, GOVERNANCE PRINCIPLES, supra note 193, at 9–10. This posture is broadly 
representative of institutional investors generally. See COUNCIL INSTITUTIONAL INV., supra 
note 145 (observing that the organization was formed by institutions that “felt that by 
pooling their resources, institutional investors could use their burgeoning proxy power to 
hold companies accountable”). 
 206. See generally CIOFFI, supra note 28; Cioffi & Höpner, supra note 27. 
 207. Cioffi & Höpner, supra note 27, at 464. 
 208. See generally MARK J. ROE, POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE GOVER-
NANCE: POLITICAL CONTEXT, CORPORATE IMPACT (paperback ed. 2006). See also BRUNER, 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD, supra note 40, at 119–23 (discus-
sing Roe’s social democracy theory). 
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governance reform and the institutional adjustment to finance 
capitalism.”209 They also found that associated “political actors” 
have themselves “taken the lead in advancing corporate gover-
nance reform” (as opposed to “unions, shareholders, or other 
interest groups”), suggesting a strong imperative emanating from 
broader party politics.210 These findings are difficult to square 
with the broader theoretical work noted above, and with the 
views that traditional political affiliations would lead us to 
expect—although it has been suggested in more recent work, 
building on such comparative analyses, that the key to reconciling 
them may be to focus on political shifts over time. In particular, 
Thibault Darcillon has observed that shareholder-centric reforms 
have correlated with rightward shifts in party politics, including 
rightward shifts among left-leaning parties toward the center of 
the political spectrum.211 This trend, Darcillon finds, is observable 
across various OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation 
and Development) countries,212 rendering the striking association 
of center-left parties with shareholder-centric corporate gover-
nance reforms at least broadly compatible with research that 
correlates stockholding with more right-leaning politics.213 Such 
shifts over time may also help explain some of the more notable 
disjunctures described above—say, labor’s support of state-level 
anti-takeover laws in the 1980s and their more recent support for 
efforts to dismantle takeover defenses starting in the 1990s. 
Indeed, the trends discussed above appear clearly to have 
been operative in the United States, where the period of intensely 
shareholder-centric reforms since the 1990s maps coherently onto 
the rise of the so-called “New Democrats”—a movement, closely 
associated with the ascendance of President Bill Clinton, that 
decidedly shifted the Democratic Party toward the political 
center.214 The rise of the New Democrats reflected a strong pivot 
 
 209. Cioffi & Höpner, supra note 27, at 464 (emphasis omitted). 
 210. Id. at 491. 
 211. See Darcillon, supra note 35, at 661–69, 686–93; see also Roe, supra note 109, at 89–90. 
 212. See Darcillon, supra note 35, at 673–84. 
 213. See Nessler & Davis, supra note 125, at 5, 12–13. 
 214. See generally FROM, supra note 25 (providing a history of the New Democrats, 
with a foreword by Bill Clinton). See also Cioffi & Höpner, supra note 27, at 491; Darcillon, 
supra note 35, at 668–69; Andrew Leigh, The Rise and Fall of the Third Way, 75 AQ: 
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toward the center-left in the late 1980s and the 1990s, responding 
to the party’s near inability to win national elections in the 1970s 
and 1980s.215 The “Democratic Leadership Council,” formed in 
1985 outside the formal party apparatus,216 viewed itself as “the 
venue for redefining the Democratic Party”217—a posture that 
brought with it more right-leaning policies, such as promotion of 
international trade, creating tensions with labor unions.218 The 
core themes animating this pivot toward the center were 
“opportunity, responsibility, and community,”219 and policies 
pursued under this banner drew from both traditionally liberal 
and traditionally conservative ideas. This effectively wedded com-
mitment to civil rights and civil liberties with both rejection of 
outcomes-based social welfare policy and pursuit of deficit re-
duction and trade liberalization as means of achieving economic 
growth.220 This shift toward the center has been credited with 
helping propel Bill Clinton to victory in the 1992 presidential 
race,221 and these themes are clearly reflected in Democratic Party 
platforms since the early 1990s.222 They have also inspired similar 
 
AUSTRALIAN Q., Mar.–Apr. 2003, at 10, 12; Graham K. Wilson, Clinton, Bill, in 1 THE OXFORD 
COMPANION TO AMERICAN POLITICS 203, 203 (David Coates ed., 2012). 
 215. See FROM, supra note 25 at 5–6 (observing that Jimmy Carter lost forty-four states 
in the 1980 election, that Walter Mondale lost forty-nine states in the 1984 election, and that 
Michael Dukakis’s loss in 1988 “marked the fifth Democratic defeat in six presidential 
cycles, a losing streak interrupted only by Jimmy Carter’s narrow victory in 1976 in the 
wake of the Watergate scandal”); Flavio Romano, Clinton and Blair: The Economics of the 
Third Way, 10 J. ECON. & SOC. POL’Y 1, 3 (2006) (describing such a shift from the left toward 
the center as an electoral imperative). These difficulties have been variously attributed to 
the party’s loss of Southern Democrats following the civil rights movement, weakening of 
the anticommunism consensus following the Vietnam conflict, and mistrust among middle 
class voters on issues including defense and the economy. See, e.g., FROM, supra note 25, at 
8–10, 102–05; Marjorie Randon Hershey, Democratic Party, in 1 THE OXFORD COMPANION TO 
AMERICAN POLITICS 262, 265–66 (David Coates ed., 2012); Nicol C. Rae, Republican Party, in 2 
THE OXFORD COMPANION TO AMERICAN POLITICS 275, 275–76 (David Coates ed., 2012). 
 216. See FROM, supra note 25, at 53. 
 217. Id. at 110. 
 218. See id. at 68, 146–48, 204–09; see also THOMAS FRANK, LISTEN, LIBERAL: OR, WHAT 
EVER HAPPENED TO THE PARTY OF THE PEOPLE? 44–51 (2016). 
 219. FROM, supra note 25, at 148. 
 220. See id. at 128–29; see also FRANK, supra note 218, at 30–33. 
 221. See generally FROM, supra note 25. 
 222. For background on party platforms, see generally AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/index.php (last visited June 25, 2018) (compiled by John 
T. Woolley and Gerhard Peters and hosted by the University of California, Santa Barbara). 
For the Democratic Party’s platforms from 1992 to 2012 (in chronological order), see the 
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shifts toward the center among left-leaning parties in other 
countries, often referred to collectively as representing “Third 
Way” politics—a particularly noteworthy example being Tony 
Blair’s “New Labour” strategy in the United Kingdom.223 
Given the nature of this shift away from what are often 
regarded as paradigmatic left-wing commitments, it is hardly 
surprising that “Third Way” politics have given rise to heated 
debates—notably regarding whether this shift in fact amounts to a 
 
following: Democratic Party, A New Covenant with the American People (July 13, 1992), 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=29610 (1992 Democratic Party Plat-
form emphasizing themes of “opportunity,” “responsibility,” and “community,” and 
“reject[ing] both the do-nothing government of the last twelve years and the big govern-
ment theory that says we can hamstring business and tax and spend our way to prosper-
ity”); Democratic Party, Today’s Democratic Party: Meeting America’s Challenges, Protecting 
America’s Values (Aug. 26, 1996), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid= 
29611 (1996 Democratic Party Platform emphasizing similar themes and praising deficit 
reduction, “open and fair trade,” and “national welfare reform”); Democratic Party, 2000 
Democratic Party Platform (Aug. 14, 2000), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php 
?pid=29612 (2000 Democratic Party Platform similarly emphasizing “our basic American 
values of hard work, community, embracing diversity, faith, family, and personal respon-
sibility,” with similar policy prescriptions); Democratic Party, 2004 Democratic Party 
Platform (July 27, 2004), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=29613 (“The 
simple bargain at the heart of the American Dream offers opportunity to every American 
who takes the responsibility to make the most of it.”); Democratic Party, Renewing America’s 
Promise (Aug. 25, 2008), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid=78283 (“Today, 
we pledge a return to core moral principles like stewardship, service to others, personal 
responsibility, shared sacrifice and a fair shot for all . . . .”); Democratic Party, Moving 
America Forward (Sept. 3, 2012), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/print.php?pid= 
101962 (2012 Democratic Party Platform advancing “the simple principle that in America, 
hard work should pay off, responsibility should be rewarded, and each one of us should be 
able to go as far as our talent and drive take us”).  
 223. For additional background on the spread of “Third Way” politics from Clinton’s 
Democratic Party to self-styled center-left parties elsewhere, see generally Niall Dickson, 
What is the Third Way?, BBC NEWS (Sept. 27, 1999), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/458626 
.stm; Andrew Gamble, The Meaning of the Third Way, in THE BLAIR EFFECT 2001–5, at 430, 
430 (Anthony Seldon & Dennis Kavanagh eds., 2005); ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE THIRD WAY 
AND ITS CRITICS (2000) [hereinafter GIDDENS, CRITICS]; Anthony Giddens, The Third Way 
Revisited, POL’Y NETWORK (June 28, 2010), http://www.policy-network.net/pno_detail 
.aspx?ID=3868&title=The+Third+Way+revisited [hereinafter Giddens, The Third Way 
Revisited]; John Judis, Is the Third Way Finished?, AM. PROSPECT (June 17, 2002), http:// 
prospect.org/article/third-way-finished; James Petras, The Third Way: Myth and Reality, 51 
MONTHLY REV. 10 (Mar. 1, 2000), http://monthlyreview.org/2000/03/01/the-third-way/; 
Romano, supra note 215. See also Lewis Baston & Simon Henig, The Labour Party, in THE 
BLAIR EFFECT 2001–5, at 112, 120–21 (Anthony Seldon & Dennis Kavanagh eds., 2005); 
FROM, supra note 25, at 239–48. 
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clever repackaging of neoliberalism.224 The proposition is certainly 
contestable,225 but there appears to be little doubt that New 
Democratic politics in the United States have involved a concerted 
effort to appeal to the elite, highly educated professional class—
including financial professionals. As Cioffi observes, in the 1990s 
“the Democrats in the United States . . . embraced much of the 
ascendant neoliberal conception of finance capitalism as the route 
to economic modernization and growth.”226 He elaborates, “The 
promise of faster economic growth and innovation fostered by 
rapid capital formation and reallocation via well-developed 
financial markets and facilitated by financially driven corporate 
restructuring appealed . . . in an era marked by chronic budget 
constraints and the limits of industrial policy.”227 This shift went 
hand-in-hand with growing rhetorical and policy emphasis on the 
importance of education, which tended to legitimize the shift 
away from outcomes-based social welfare policy—the idea being, 
in Thomas Frank’s words, “You get what you deserve, and what 
you deserve is defined by how you did in school.”228 At the same 
time, it implicitly exalted highly educated professionals, including 
financial professionals, who are often socially liberal and, of 
course, wealthy potential donors. Courting the professional class 
placed a positive face on policy shifts that might otherwise be 
regarded as callous toward the less affluent, through a consti-
tuency that appeared to mediate capital and labor insofar as they 
are not obviously assignable to one or the other category.229 
 
 224. See, e.g., Gamble, supra note 223, at 434–37; Petras, supra note 223; Romano, supra 
note 215, at 1, 12; see also FRANK, supra note 218, at 89–97. 
 225. In response, see Tony Blair, Third Way, Again, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Mar. 11, 
2016), https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/democracy/reports/2016/03/11/132492 
/third-way-again/(arguing that Third Way politics are “not about abandoning principle” 
but rather about balancing growth with social protection); Giddens, The Third Way Revisit-
ed, supra note 223 (rejecting this characterization and arguing that social democracy had to 
evolve to survive); Judis, supra note 223 (characterizing Third Way politics as “the only 
politically viable alternative to laissez-faire conservatism and the populist right, as well as 
to socialist or social-democratic politics of the old left”). 
 226. CIOFFI, supra note 28, at 9. 
 227. Id.; FRANK, supra note 218, at 68. 
 228. FRANK, supra note 218, at 69 (emphasis removed). 
 229. See id. at 20–25, 68–73, 129–30; see also Romano, supra note 215, at 5–6. 
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The New Democrats’ embrace of finance over recent decades 
clearly paid dividends in the form of campaign funds.230 The very 
close ties between Bill Clinton’s administration and Wall Street 
leaders are well known. This period also saw substantial 
deregulation of finance—with noteworthy examples including the 
lifting of restrictions on interstate banking and the repeal of the 
Depression-era Glass-Steagall Act, which had previously sepa-
rated investment banking from commercial banking.231 Over 
recent years, Democratic presidential candidates have generally 
done very well in raising campaign funds from financial donors. 
In the 2008 election, Barack Obama raised more money than any 
other candidate from commercial banks, hedge funds and private 
equity donors, real estate donors, and the securities and invest-
ment industry, and came in a close second with insurance 
donors.232 In the 2012 election, Mitt Romney outdid Obama in all 
of these categories,233 perhaps reflecting distaste for Obama’s post-
 
 230. Data on the sources of campaign funds are collected and made available by the 
Center for Responsive Politics, a “[n]onpartisan, independent and nonprofit” organization 
that “track[s] money in U.S. politics and its effect on elections and public policy.” Ctr. for 
Responsive Politics, Our Vision and Mission: Inform, Empower & Advocate, OPENSECRETS.ORG, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/about/ (last visited June 25, 2018). Its website, OpenSecrets.org, 
“is the most comprehensive resource for federal campaign contributions, lobbying data and 
analysis available.” Id. 
 231. See FRANK, supra note 218, at 97–105; Bruner, Conceptions of Corporate Purpose, 
supra note 4, at 549–50. 
 232. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Finance/Insurance/Real Estate Sector Totals to 
Candidates, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pres08/sectors.php?sector=F 
(last visited June 25, 2018) (2008 presidential campaign donations data); Ctr. for Responsive 
Politics, Presidential Candidates: Selected Industry Totals, 2008 Cycle: Commercial Banks, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pres08/select.php?ind=F03 (last visited 
June 25, 2018) (2008 presidential campaign donations data); Ctr. for Responsive Politics, 
Presidential Candidates: Selected Industry Totals, 2008 Cycle: Hedge Funds & Private Equity, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pres08/select.php?ind=F27 (last visited 
June 25, 2018) (2008 presidential campaign donations data); Ctr. for Responsive Politics, 
Presidential Candidates: Selected Industry Totals, 2008 Cycle: Insurance, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http:// 
www.opensecrets.org/pres08/select.php?ind=F09 (last visited June 25, 2018) (2008 presi-
dential campaign donations data); Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Presidential Candidates: 
Selected Industry Totals, 2008 Cycle: Real Estate, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets 
.org/pres08/select.php?ind=F10 (last visited June 25, 2018) (2008 presidential campaign 
donations data); Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Presidential Candidates: Selected Industry Totals, 
2008 Cycle: Securities & Investment, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pres08 
/select.php?ind=F07 (last visited June 25, 2018) (2008 presidential campaign donations data). 
 233. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Finance/Insurance/Real Estate Sector Totals to 
Candidates, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pres12/sectors.php?sector=F 
(last visited June 25, 2018) (2012 presidential campaign donations data); Ctr. for Responsive 
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crisis financial regulatory initiatives, as well as Mitt Romney’s 
greater appeal among these donors as a former private equity 
investor himself.234 In the 2016 election, however, Hillary Clinton 
topped all other candidates in several of these categories, includ-
ing commercial banks, hedge funds and private equity donors, 
real estate donors, and the securities and investment industry.235 
To be sure, there is ample evidence that, overall, financial 
sector campaign contributions are bipartisan and typically follow 
 
Politics, Selected Industry Totals: Commercial Banks, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www. 
opensecrets.org/pres12/select.php?ind=F03 (last visited June 25, 2018) (2012 presidential 
campaign donations data); Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Selected Industry Totals: Hedge Funds 
& Private Equity, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pres12/select.php?ind 
=F27 (last visited June 25, 2018) (2012 presidential campaign donations data); Ctr. for 
Responsive Politics, Selected Industry Totals: Insurance, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www. 
opensecrets.org/pres12/select.php?ind=F09 (last visited June 25, 2018) (2012 presidential 
campaign donations data); Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Selected Industry Totals: Real Estate, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/pres12/select.php?ind=F10 (last visited 
June 25, 2018) (2012 presidential campaign donations data); Ctr. for Responsive Politics, 
Selected Industry Totals: Securities & Investment, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.open 
secrets.org/pres12/select.php?ind=F07 (last visited June 25, 2018) (2012 presidential cam-
paign donations data). 
 234. See William D. Cohan, Why Wall Street Loves Hillary, POLITICO (Nov. 11, 2014), 
http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/11/why-wall-street-loves-hillary-112782 
(“During the 2012 presidential election, Wall Street felt burned by Obama’s rhetoric and 
regulatory positions and overwhelmingly supported with their money Republican 
candidate Mitt Romney, co-founder of private-equity firm Bain Capital.”). 
 235. See Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Sector Totals to Candidates: Finance/Insurance/ 
Real Estate, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/pres16/select-sectors?sector 
=F (last visited June 25, 2018) (2016 presidential campaign donations data); Ctr. for 
Responsive Politics, Selected Industry Totals: Commercial Banks, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https:// 
www.opensecrets.org/pres16/select-industries?ind=F03 (last visited June 25, 2018) (2016 
presidential campaign donations data); Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Selected Industry Totals: 
Hedge Funds & Private Equity, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/pres16 
/select-industries?ind=F27 (last visited June 25, 2018) (2016 presidential campaign 
donations data); Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Selected Industry Totals: Insurance, 
OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/pres16/select-industries?ind=F09 (last 
visited June 25, 2018) (2016 presidential campaign donations data); Ctr. for Responsive 
Politics, Selected Industry Totals: Real Estate, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets 
.org/pres16/select-industries?ind=F10 (last visited June 25, 2018) (2016 presidential cam-
paign donations data); Ctr. for Responsive Politics, Selected Industry Totals: Securities & 
Investment, OPENSECRETS.ORG, https://www.opensecrets.org/pres16/select-industries? ind= 
F07 (last visited June 25, 2018) (2016 presidential campaign donations data); see also Cohan, 
supra note 234 (“The bottom line for Wall Street . . . is that Clinton understands that 
America’s much-maligned financial industry wants to be part of the solution to the 
country’s problems.”). 
01.BRUNER_FIN_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 9/7/18  10:01 AM 
267 Center-Left Politics and Corporate Governance 
 321 
the power,236 and much of Hillary Clinton’s support in the 2016 
race came from a small number of ultra-rich donors.237 Neverthe-
less, it remained clear that she had “deep and lasting relation-
ships with banking and investment titans” extending back to her 
husband’s presidency, which were reinforced during her service as a 
senator for New York, where Wall Street was a vital constituency.238 
In discerning the relevance of the foregoing to the issues and 
subject matter at the heart of this article—the politics of corporate 
governance—it is critical to recognize that Democratic Party 
operatives need not necessarily care about these issues in and of 
themselves and, indeed, may know little about them. From a 
narrow instrumental perspective, it is entirely plausible that their 
goal is simply to assemble a stable coalition that can finance a 
national electoral strategy—and if that coalition favors share-
holders, then we should not expect these party officials to concern 
themselves with ensuring the coherence of such policies with 
state-level “progressive” preferences regarding substantive 
corporate law. 
An indirect indication that such dynamics may be operative 
arises from intra-party tensions over the perception that the 
“New” Democratic Party has excessively retreated from their 
traditional strong-form commitment to the pursuit of equality and 
improving the lot of working people.239 Over recent years, there 
has been a growing impression, as Steven Hayward puts it, that 
“the ‘malefactors of great wealth’ have become the benefactors of 
today’s liberalism, and Democrats have become the party of the 
 
 236. See, e.g., Press Release, Wall Street Watch, $5 Billion in Political Contributions 
Bought Wall Street Freedom from Regulation, Restraint, Report Finds (Mar. 4, 2009), 
http://wallstreetwatch.org/soldoutreport.php (observing that from 1998 to 2008 “about 55 
percent of [Wall Street] political donations went to Republicans and 45 percent to 
Democrats, primarily reflecting the balance of power over the decade”); see also Ctr. for 
Responsive Politics, Banking: Data Snapshot, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets 
.org/news/issues/banking/data.php (last visited June 25, 2018) (2011–12 data on the bank-
ing, securities, and insurance industry’s campaign finance and lobbying activity). 
 237. See Matea Gold et al., Clinton Blasts Wall Street, but Still Draws Millions in 
Contributions, WASH. POST (Feb. 4, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics 
/clinton-blasts-wall-street-but-still-draws-millions-in-contributions/2016/02/04/05e1be00 
-c9c2-11e5-ae11-57b6aeab993f_story.html (reporting that approximately half of Clinton’s 
donations from the financial sector came from George Soros and S. Donald Sussman). 
 238. Id. 
 239. See generally FRANK, supra note 218. 
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rich.”240 This perception reflects the fact that even though “labor 
unions (along with trial lawyers) still provide the majority of the 
Democratic Party’s campaign funds and organizational muscle on 
election day,” the “super rich of Silicon Valley and Wall Street . . . 
command the priority attention of Democratic Party leaders these 
days.”241 A more direct indication that such dynamics may be 
operative arises, then, from the fact that the inherent, substantive 
implications of “New Democratic” or “Third Way” political prin-
ciples for corporate governance remain far from clear. A brief 
perusal of Democratic Party platforms since the early 1990s, for 
example, reveals that corporate governance has received scant 
attention, prompting at most an occasional, oblique reference with 
no substantive discussion of any sort.242 
Meanwhile, it is quite clear that Democrats have, over recent 
decades, sought to forge a coalition of financial and labor 
interests.243 “Third Way” parties of the center-left have broadly 
 
 240. Steven F. Hayward, How Did the Democrats Become the Party of the Rich?, FORBES 
(Jan. 8, 2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevenhayward/2014/01/08/how-did-the 
-democrats-become-the-party-of-the-rich/print/. 
 241. Id.; see also CIOFFI, supra note 28, at 19 (observing that the United States now has 
“two pro-business parties”). 
 242. For examples (in chronological order), see Democratic Party, A New Covenant 
with the American People (July 13, 1992), supra note 222 (endorsing collective bargaining and 
pay-for-performance among corporate executives, without substantial discussion); 
Democratic Party, Today’s Democratic Party: Meeting America’s Challenges, Protecting 
America’s Values (Aug. 26, 1996), supra note 222 (calling for “long-term” corporate 
investment and “opportunities for greater involvement in company decision making and 
ownership,” without substantial discussion); Democratic Party, 2000 Democratic Party 
Platform (Aug. 14, 2000), supra note 222 (making no straightforward mention of topics 
related to corporate governance); Democratic Party, 2004 Democratic Party Platform (July 27, 
2004), supra note 222 (endorsing “requiring honesty in corporate accounting[,] effective 
corporate governance, [and] a fair shake for small investors and worker pension funds,” 
without substantial discussion); Democratic Party, Renewing America’s Promise (Aug. 25, 
2008), supra note 222 (endorsing say-on-pay votes and “innovation in corporate respon-
sibility,” without substantial discussion); Democratic Party, Moving America Forward 
(Sept. 3, 2012), supra note 222 (associating shareholder wealth maximization and 
recklessness on Wall Street with Republicans, without substantial discussion). For similarly 
vague discussions of corporate governance in the context of “Third Way” political 
discussions outside the United States see, for example, GIDDENS, CRITICS, supra note 223, at 
118–19 (endorsing pay-for-performance and corporate social responsibility, without 
substantial discussion) and at 149–52 (endorsing “employee share ownership schemes” and 
rejecting both strong-form shareholder-centrism and stakeholder-centrism, without identi-
fying a favored alternative). 
 243. See Hershey, supra note 215, at 266. 
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been criticized for seeking “to construct a bogus coalition between 
the haves and the have nots,”244 and whether or not this is a fair 
characterization, it bore fruit as a matter of electoral politics245—at 
least for a time. Regardless of the quite marginal nature of corpo-
rate governance in larger strategic thinking about electoral 
coalitions and the overall party platform, it is equally undeniable 
that this shift has had significant effects on how the left positions 
itself on corporate governance issues as a matter of national party 
politics. At its most elemental level, in corporate governance 
terms, a coalition of financial and labor interests effectively allies 
shareholders and employees against management—and the 
potency of this coalition has been fully apparent in reform efforts 
over recent years. Notably, the highly shareholder-centric reforms 
adopted in the wake of the financial crisis (described above) have, 
both rhetorically and substantively, focused intensely on the 
interests and perceived vulnerabilities of the “middle class.” This 
amorphous concept has “come generally to stand for the 
investment-related and social welfare-related goals and concerns 
of the average working family,” creating “a conceptual bridge 
between the incentives and interests of ‘employees’ and 
‘shareholders’” due to the market and legal dynamics described in 
prior sections.246 
The political power of this framing is rooted in such market 
and legal dynamics.247 In understanding the political dynamics, 
however, it remains critical to bear in mind that intellectual 
coherence in the theory and practice of corporate governance need 
not be (and likely is not) of central concern to any relevant actor at 
the federal level. Simply put, electoral imperatives trump all, and 
pursuit of these imperatives requires taking the foregoing market 
trends, legal developments, and political realities as they are and 
 
 244. Dickson, supra note 223; see also FRANK, supra note 218, at 58; GIDDENS, CRITICS, 
supra note 223, at 22–23; Romano, supra note 215, at 12–13; Wilson, supra note 214, at 203. 
 245. See, e.g., Judis, supra note 223 (observing that “Clinton was the first Democrat re-
elected since Roosevelt” and that “Blair was the first Labour prime minister ever to 
succeed himself”). 
 246. BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD, supra note 40, 
at 278–86; see also Bruner, Conceptions of Corporate Purpose, supra note 4, at 553–55; Bruner, 
Corporate Governance Reform in a Time of Crisis, supra note 68, at 336–39. 
 247. See, e.g., CIOFFI, supra note 28, at 9–10, 26, 37, 113–14, 232, 240–41; Gelter, The 
Pension System, supra note 75, at 912–15. 
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endeavoring to forge an effective coalition using the tools and 
opportunities at hand. 
To be sure, while these dynamics have remained important to 
the Democratic Party’s electoral strategy since the 1990s, the 
finance-driven coalition described above remains highly contro-
versial and unstable, reflecting the fact that core intellectual and 
ideological tensions in the platform of the U.S. center-left per-
sist.248 In the 2016 primary, for example, Hillary Clinton’s “deep 
ties to the financial sector . . . emerged as one of her biggest 
obstacles,” and as of February 2016 she had already “earned more 
than $3.7 million for delivering paid speeches to banks and other 
financial services firms since leaving the State Department in 
2013.”249 Her strained efforts to reintroduce more traditional left-
wing themes, while at the same time maintaining a bridge to 
finance, led some to criticize such toggling between the “reform 
wing” and the “Wall Street wing” of the Democratic Party.250 
Perhaps tellingly, even when she made “forays into fiery rhetoric” 
to match Sanders, Wall Street bankers by and large “dismiss[ed] it 
quickly as political maneuvers. None of them [thought] she really 
mean[t] her populism.”251 As of this writing, it remains unclear 
whether the New Democratic coalition and associated electoral 
strategy can survive Clinton’s loss to her fundamentally populist 
Republican opponent, Donald Trump252—an unexpected defeat 
 
 248. Cf. CIOFFI, supra note 28, at 32, 250 (observing that the shareholder-employee 
coalition “is founded on the narrowest of grounds and should prove the most unstable” 
due to the numerous “areas of conflict” between them, including “takeover law, norms of 
shareholder primacy, stakeholder rights and employee representation, and distribu-
tional issues”). 
 249. Gold et al., supra note 237; see also Cohan, supra note 234. 
 250. See Gold et al., supra note 237; see also Thomas Frank, The Issue Is Not Hillary 
Clinton’s Wall St Links but Democrats’ Core Dogmas, GUARDIAN (Feb. 16, 2016), http:// 
www.theguardian.com/global/2016/feb/16/the-issue-is-not-hillary-clintons-wall-st-links 
-but-her-partys-core-dogmas (observing that Sanders’s surge in the primary was not due to 
voters rejecting “Hillary the Capable,” but rather “the party whose leadership faction she 
represents as well as the direction in which our modern Democrats have been travelling 
for decades”). 
 251. Cohan, supra note 234. 
 252. See, e.g., Aaron Blake, The Top 15 Democratic Presidential Candidates for 2020, 
Ranked, WASH. POST (Dec. 22, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/the-fix/wp 
/2017/12/22/the-top-15-democratic-presidential-candidates-for-2020-ranked/?utm_term= 
.bae7685a4a40 (observing that, as of December 2017, the “field appears certain to be 
extremely big and wide open”); see also Chris Cillizza, The Next Generation of Democratic 
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attributed in part to Clinton’s inability “to make a persuasive case 
for herself as a champion of the economically downtrodden.”253 
Her loss was widely interpreted as “a historic rebuke of the 
Democratic Party from the white blue-collar voters who had 
formed the party base from the presidency of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt,” costing the party the support of Midwest “industrial 
towns once full of union voters.”254 
Undoubtedly, post-crisis reform efforts favoring share-
holders—even though short-term risk-seeking is thought to have 
driven the crisis—reflect just how thoroughly bound up the 
Democratic Party became with the financial sector and their 
interests. The fact that corporate governance reforms suddenly 
received such emphasis, rather than meaningful financial sector 
reform, illustrated the power of “[i]nterest group alignments and 
coalitional dynamics.”255 Financial institutions “fiercely resisted 
broader financial system reforms,” and their “[m]uted opposition 
to the progress of corporate governance reforms . . . may have 
reflected a political and legal bet by financial sector managers that 
enhanced shareholder powers within corporate governance 
would likely prove less constraining and threatening than other 
items on the postcrisis reform agenda.”256 In this light, it was 
hardly surprising that Hillary Clinton’s financial policy ideas in 
the 2016 election were thought to have come straight from Wall 
 
Leaders Is, Um, Nonexistent, WASH. POST (Nov. 16, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost 
.com/news/the-fix/wp/2016/11/16/the-next-generation-of-democratic-leaders-is-um-nonex 
istent/?utm_term=.956ae499736b; Sam Frizell, Democrats Elevate Bernie Sanders and Elizabeth 
Warren as Party Plots Comeback, TIME (Nov. 16, 2016), http://time.com/4573592/bernie 
-sanders-elizabeth-warren-democrats/; Ed Kilgore, The End of the Clinton Era of Democratic 
Politics, N.Y. MAG. (Nov. 10, 2016), http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2016/11/the 
-end-of-the-clinton-era-of-democratic-politics.html; Jonathan Martin & Alexander Burns, 
Democrats at Crossroads: Win Back Working-Class Whites, or Let Them Go?, N.Y. TIMES 
(Dec. 15, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/15/us/politics/democrats-joe-biden 
-hillary-clinton.html?ref=politics&_r=0. 
 253. Matt Flegenheimer & Michael Barbaro, Donald Trump Is Elected President in Stun-
ning Repudiation of the Establishment, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com 
/2016/11/09/us/politics/hillary-clinton-donald-trump-president.html?action=click&pgtype 
=Homepage&clickSource=story-heading&module=span-abc-region&region=span-abc-region 
&WT.nav=span-abc-region. 
 254. Id. 
 255. See CIOFFI, supra note 28, at 214. 
 256. See id. at 209–17; see also Robert B. Reich, Wall Street’s Democrats, ROBERT REICH 
(Dec. 8, 2014), http://robertreich.org/post/104684097130. 
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Street. These included resistance against reinstating the Glass-
Steagall Act, endorsement of initiatives to promote long-term 
investment, and “clos[ure of] the carried-interest tax loophole 
through which private equity, venture capital, real estate and 
hedge fund investors are able to pay lower taxes on certain 
investment profits” (a proposal opposed by private equity 
investors but endorsed by many other Clinton supporters).257 Such 
ideas reflected “a likely osmosis of ideas from years of interaction 
with people interested in finance,”258 aptly summarizing the 
manner in which the Democratic Party has absorbed ideas and 
campaign contributions from financial sector donors. These dyna-
mics, in turn, have amplified the political rationale driving the 
Democrats toward the political center and dovetailing with the 
market and legal dynamics described above. These are powerful 
economic, legal, and political forces indeed—and the compati-
bility of their impacts with theoretical approaches and policies 
favored by “progressive” commentators on state-level corporate 
law simply is not part of the equation. 
IV. PROSPECTS FOR STATE/FEDERAL CONVERGENCE 
In light of the complex and surprising manner in which the 
disjuncture between the corporate governance policy preferences 
of the political left at the state and federal levels has arisen, it 
remains to consider what the prospects for convergence might be. 
While a possibility for convergence exists, it is difficult to imagine 
the gap closing entirely, and the principal modes of potential 
convergence are not necessarily to be found where many might 
have expected them to arise. 
In theory, direct linkages between federal and state law 
affecting corporate governance might develop. At the extreme, 
Congress retains authority under the Commerce Clause to take 
over the field of corporate law as and when it likes.259 Federal-
izing corporate law was proposed at various points in the 
 
 257. See Anupreeta Das, Hillary Clinton No Stranger to Wall Street’s Thinkers, WALL 
STREET J. (Feb. 8, 2016, 4:59 PM), https://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2016/02/08/hillary 
-clinton-no-stranger-to-wall-streets-thinkers/. 
 258. Id. 
 259. See supra note 66. 
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twentieth century, though such efforts went nowhere,260 and 
nothing in the way of recent developments would tend to suggest 
that such a possibility has become any more likely. More 
modestly, linkages might be forged directly between relevant 
federal and state actors—one noteworthy example being the 
process by which the SEC can submit questions of corporate law 
directly to the Delaware Supreme Court.261 This mechanism has 
remained little used, however, and as a general matter, federal 
lawmakers and regulators obviously need not consult Delaware if 
they do not care (or do not think they will like) what Delaware has 
to say262—a distinct possibility that follows directly from the sorts 
of distinctions drawn throughout this article. 
Another potential mode of federal and state coordination in 
this area, which has arisen in unexpected ways over recent years, 
involves pronouncements on the nature and purposes of corpo-
rations from none other than the U.S. Supreme Court itself. Just as 
Congress can legislatively impact corporate governance, the U.S. 
Supreme Court can judicially impact it, and this has been vividly 
illustrated in recent years by two decisions with substantial 
implications for the sorts of dynamics discussed here—the 2010 
Citizens United decision263 and the 2014 Hobby Lobby decision.264 
In Citizens United, the Supreme Court struck down a provision 
of the McCain-Feingold Act that had prevented corporations from 
making independent political campaign expenditures from the 
corporate treasury, concluding that “the Government may not 
suppress political speech on the basis of the speaker’s corporate 
identity. No sufficient governmental interest justifies limits on the 
political speech of nonprofit or for-profit corporations.”265 Even 
though the opinion was “the product of the five more conser-
vative judges on the Court,” its reasoning is, as Leo Strine and 
 
 260. See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text. 
 261. See Bruner, Managing Corporate Federalism, supra note 68, at 16–20, 36–38, 42–51 
(providing background on this process). 
 262. Cf. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, supra note 67, at 600–06 (arguing that, if anything, 
due to the omnipresent threat of federal intervention, Delaware corporate law consists of 
“only what the federal authorities like or tolerate”). 
 263. Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 264. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014). 
 265. Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 365–66 (striking down § 203 of the McCain-Feingold 
Act); see also Kesten, supra note 137, at 163–75; Strine & Walter, supra note 4, at 359–62. 
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Nicholas Walter emphasize, clearly “inconsistent with conser-
vative corporate theory,” in that the Court legitimated unlimited 
expenditures by reference to shareholder-imposed constraints, 
notwithstanding the widespread conservative view that share-
holders are poorly positioned to monitor management.266 Further-
more, they observe, the conceptual and moral argument in favor 
of shareholder wealth maximization is effectively undermined by 
corporations’ newfound ability to engage in unlimited political 
spending. 267 The expectation that corporations will spend corpo-
rate resources to preclude or eliminate costly regulation under-
mines reliance upon extra-corporate regulation as a means of 
forcing corporations to absorb the costs of externalities that flow 
directly from the single-minded pursuit of shareholder wealth.268 
Strine self-identifies as “an unabashed New Deal Democrat,”269 
who apparently favors shareholder wealth maximization as a 
corporate law rule, combined with robust external regulation to 
contain its excesses.270 He acknowledges (in his work with 
Walter), however, that shareholder wealth maximization looks 
quite unappealing when corporations have such extraordinary 
latitude to interfere directly in the processes that generate the 
rules purportedly constraining them—and that stakeholder-
oriented theories of the corporation and corporate law correla-
tively look more appealing.271 
 
 266. See Strine & Walter, supra note 4, at 337–40, 363–65. 
 267. See id. at 363–65. 
 268. See id. at 342–46, 350–59, 381–89; see also Kesten, supra note 137, at 182, 221. 
 269. David Marcus, Leo Strine’s Marvelous Adventures, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. 
GOVERNANCE & FIN. REG. (Oct. 2, 2008), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2008/10/02 
/leo-strines-marvelous-adventures/; see also Strine, Toward Common Sense, supra note 43, at 
2 (describing his work as “counsel and policy director” to Governor Thomas Carper, a 
“New Democrat”); Strine, The Dangers of Denial, supra note 58, at 761 (implicitly identifying 
with “the center-left of American politics”). 
 270. See Strine, The Dangers of Denial, supra note 58, at 768, 786–93. 
 271. See Strine & Walter, supra note 4, at 389–90. I have argued elsewhere that the 
weakness of extra-corporate protections for non-shareholders (particularly employees) in 
the United States has effectively inhibited U.S. corporate law from adopting the more 
shareholder-centric governance structures that one finds in jurisdictions offering more 
robust social welfare protections, including the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada. 
See generally BRUNER, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN THE COMMON-LAW WORLD, supra 
note 40. 
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It is interesting, and perhaps ironic, that progressive corporate 
law theory would be bolstered in this oddly indirect manner by 
the conservative justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, but this is not 
the only instance in which this has occurred. Corporate law 
theorists of a progressive bent can similarly find Supreme Court 
authority to bolster their views in the Hobby Lobby decision, where 
the Court held that closely held for-profit corporations with reli-
gious owners can invoke free exercise protections under the 
Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), that the contraceptive 
mandate in the Affordable Care Act (ACA) substantially bur-
dened the free exercise rights of such corporations, and that the 
mandate could not be justified as “the least restrictive means of 
serving a compelling government interest.”272 In so doing, the Su-
preme Court—again, through its conservative justices273—
articulated a “vision of corporations [that] is highly consistent 
with liberal visions of the corporation,” notably in rejecting the 
notion that shareholder wealth maximization represents the sole 
legitimate aim of corporation decision-making.274 Strict commit-
ment to shareholder wealth maximization, to the exclusion of all 
other goals, might tend to imply that for-profit corporations 
should not have standing to pursue free exercise complaints 
under the RFRA,275 yet the Court outright rejected such a narrow 
conception of the for-profit corporation’s legitimate aims: 
 Some lower court judges have suggested that RFRA does not 
protect for-profit corporations because the purpose of such 
corporations is simply to make money. This argument flies in the 
face of modern corporate law. . . . While it is certainly true that a 
central objective of for-profit corporations is to make money, 
modern corporate law does not require for-profit corporations to 
 
 272. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2759–60 (2014); see also 
Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Corporate Law After Hobby Lobby, 70 BUS. LAW. 1, 1–2 
(2014). While the opinion expressly did not address public companies, “the majority’s 
reasoning” might well apply beyond the context of closely held companies. See Johnson & 
Millon, supra, at 25–26. 
 273. Justice Alito’s opinion was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Scalia, 
Kennedy, and Thomas (with Kennedy filing a concurring opinion). Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 
134 S. Ct. at 2759; see also McDonnell, supra note 4, at 778 (“Conservatives celebrated, while 
liberals expressed outrage.”). 
 274. See McDonnell, supra note 4, at 778–83. 
 275. See id. at 789–91. 
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pursue profit at the expense of everything else, and many do not 
do so. For-profit corporations, with ownership approval, sup-
port a wide variety of charitable causes, and it is not at all 
uncommon for such corporations to further humanitarian and 
other altruistic objectives. . . . If for-profit corporations may 
pursue such worthy objectives, there is no apparent reason why 
they may not further religious objectives as well.276 
As Brett McDonnell observes, this conception of the corporation’s 
legitimate purposes “works as a ringing endorsement of the stake-
holder conception of the corporation that many liberals and pro-
gressives prefer” and “certainly denies the existence of an immu-
table duty to only consider the financial interests of shareholders.”277 
To be sure, the political left has hardly celebrated the opinion. 
While Democrats supported enactment of the RFRA (during the 
Clinton administration, at a time when Democrats controlled both 
houses of Congress), the ACA is by and large quite important to 
many on the left, who “may not identify with the sorts of religious 
commitments one finds in this case.”278 It is indeed striking that 
state corporate law progressives not only would encounter 
hostility toward their views on corporate law among the 
Democratic Party establishment and central components of the 
modern Democratic electoral coalition, but that they would find 
their most powerful federal allies (at least in corporate governance 
terms) among the conservative justices of the U.S. Supreme 
Court.279 As Lyman Johnson, a conservative communitarian 
scholar, and David Millon, a left-leaning scholar, observe together 
in their analysis of the Hobby Lobby decision, however, the 
majority’s “decidedly pluralistic view of corporate purpose” 
naturally—and perhaps necessarily—facilitates pursuit of both 
 
 276. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. at 2770–71. 
 277. McDonnell, supra note 4, at 804; see also Johnson & Millon, supra note 272, at 10 
(characterizing the government’s argument “that business corporations lack the lawful 
authority to do anything other than pursue financial gain” as a view that “resonates with 
the claims of conservative corporate law academics who assert that corporate law 
mandates profit maximization”). 
 278. McDonnell, supra note 4, at 808; see also id. at 784–85, 808–11, 820. 
 279. It should be noted that this disjuncture reflects an inconsistency among political 
conservatives as well, in terms of overall normative preferences in corporate governance—
notably between libertarian and communitarian brands of conservatism. See supra notes 18–
21 and accompanying text. 
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religiously motivated corporate goals, predominantly (though not 
exclusively) resonating with those on the right, and “such avowed 
goals as social justice, environmental concerns, and employee 
welfare,” predominantly (though not exclusively) resonating with 
those on the left.280 This is an important dimension of the opinion 
“that critics have overlooked.”281 
The Supreme Court’s Citizens United and Hobby Lobby deci-
sions illustrate that, as among the political left, views regarding 
the desirability or inevitability of strict shareholder-centrism vary 
considerably among the political right—and that conservative 
communitarianism and social liberalism can more easily find 
common cause in debates regarding corporate purpose than is 
typically acknowledged. Ultimately, however, it is unlikely that 
such developments will go very far in rendering the overall U.S. 
corporate governance system any more conceptually coherent 
than it is today. Generally speaking, it has to be conceded that the 
U.S. Supreme Court is hardly the forum to which one looks for 
top-shelf corporate legal theory.282 (The same, of course, could be 
said of Congress.283) And when it comes to corporate purpose–
related issues not involving a federal constitutional dimension, 
state courts and legislatures—who remain the authors of 
corporate law—will not be bound by U.S. Supreme Court analyses 
in any event.284 Netting all of this out, and given the extraordinary 
range of political views and commitments driving these divergent 
federal trends—as well as the fact that the substantive integrity 
and overall coherence of U.S. corporate governance hardly looms 
large for any relevant federal actor—there is little reason to 
believe that the state/federal divide described in this article will 
substantially close in the foreseeable future. 
 
 280. Johnson & Millon, supra note 272, at 22. 
 281. Id. at 31. 
 282. See, e.g., McDonnell, supra note 4, at 802–03, 806 (“Supreme Court justices are not 
chosen for their expertise in corporate law, and it shows.”). 
 283. See generally Bainbridge, Dodd-Frank, supra note 90 (critiquing the Dodd-Frank 
Act as “quack” corporate governance legislation); Romano, supra note 75 (similarly 
critiquing the Sarbanes-Oxley Act as “quack” corporate governance legislation). 
 284. See Johnson & Millon, supra note 272, at 24 (observing that in such a case “the 
Delaware Court of Chancery would presumably treat the Hobby Lobby opinion as highly 
persuasive, but the Delaware Supreme Court would not be bound to follow Hobby Lobby’s 
reading of the breadth of corporate purpose”). 
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V. CONCLUSION 
The fact that left-leaning actors, whom one might reasonably 
have expected to arrive at similar views on the desirability of 
shareholder-centric policies, have pursued diametrically opposed 
normative agendas at the state and federal levels, reflects the 
extraordinary legal, institutional, and political complexities of 
corporate governance in the United States. This article has argued 
that a widespread and fundamental reorientation of the Demo-
cratic Party toward decidedly centrist national politics over recent 
decades fundamentally altered the role of corporate governance, 
and related issues, in the project of assembling a competitive 
electoral coalition. It has argued further that the legal, economic, 
and cultural trends that conditioned and incentivized this shift are 
critical to understanding the state/federal divide regarding what 
the “progressive” corporate governance agenda ought to be. As 
we have seen, several trends have prompted a center-left politics 
of corporate governance at the federal level bearing no relation 
whatsoever to the progressive agenda for corporate law at the 
state level. Such trends include the reorientation of labor unions 
away from traditional organizing activities and toward pension 
management; the intense (and ironic) focus of applicable labor 
regulation on generating returns for pensioners, including 
fiduciary obligations interpreted to require pensions to engage in 
activism aimed at forcing corporate managers to focus intently on 
maximizing returns to shareholders; and the increasingly centrist 
Democratic Party’s efforts to capitalize on these pro-shareholder 
trends by assembling an anti-manager “middle class” coalition of 
workers and financial institutions. 
I have suggested that this state/federal divide is unlikely to 
close in the foreseeable future, but that certainly does not mean 
the landscape will remain static. To the contrary, many of the 
legal, economic, and cultural trends described above continue to 
evolve. Ongoing developments affecting the power base, the 
interests, and the identity of organized labor—as well as the 
electoral strategy of the Democratic Party—will have a major 
impact on how U.S. corporate governance develops over years to 
come. It bears emphasizing that, just as flagging membership has 
prompted a shift from traditional organizing activities toward 
pension management as private-sector unions’ constituencies age, 
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so we can expect that the political and market salience of these 
institutions will wane as today’s smaller active membership 
becomes tomorrow’s smaller base of pension beneficiaries.285 As 
such developments unfold (potentially over the course of de-
cades), other forms of institutional investors may enjoy propor-
tionately greater salience in electoral politics.286 It remains entirely 
conceivable, however, that labor might politically reassert itself in 
some new institutional configuration—or return to a more central 
position in the Democratic coalition and electoral strategy 
following Hillary Clinton’s unexpected 2016 loss287—with conse-
quences that are difficult to foresee. All that can be predicted with 
any certainty is that electoral imperatives will remain paramount 
in the formulation of federal corporate governance policy, and 
that the center-left’s federal corporate governance politics will ac-
cordingly move in whatever direction the prevailing wind blows. 
 	  
 
 285. Cf. Dunn & Walker, supra note 128, at 8 (“In 2015, union membership rates were 
highest among workers ages 45 to 64—13.6 percent for those ages 45 to 54 and 14.3 percent 
for those ages 55 to 64. Nearly half of all union members were between 45 and 64 years old 
in 2015. . . . The lowest union membership rate was among workers ages 16 to 24 (4.4 
percent).”) Meanwhile, a 2013 survey of “leaders from 102 of the largest US Taft-Hartley 
pension funds, representing $150 billion in assets under management,” found “a stirring 
level of doubt among plan leaders that the existing multiemployer system is sustainable” 
due in part to “a pronounced demographic shift.” See PYRAMIS GLOBAL ADVISORS, supra 
note 133, at 1. Pyramis explains that “[a]n increasing number of retirees are now drawing 
their retirement and fewer active members are factored in to the contribution math, 
creating an unbalanced formula.” Id. Accordingly, “[n]early 40% do not believe the current 
multiemployer system is sustainable,” and “[n]early four out of every five (79%) indicated 
that a new system would likely be in place” ten years out. Id. at 1, 6. 
 286. Cf. Dunn & Walker, supra note 128, at 1, 3–4 (reporting that, in contrast with 
private-sector pensions, “union membership rates in the public sector . . . have held fairly 
steady since the early 1980s” and that as of 2015 “public-sector workers had a union 
membership rate of 35.2 percent, more than five times higher than that of private-sector 
workers (6.7 percent)”); Millon, Shareholder Social Responsibility, supra note 46, at 930–34 
(discussing “various institutional investors fac[ing] differing pressures to pursue short-
term investment strategies”). 
 287. See, e.g., Ian McKendry, Trump’s Surprise Victory Changes the Game for Financial 
Services, AM. BANKER (Nov. 9, 2016), http://www.americanbanker.com/news/law-regu 
lation/trumps-surprise-victory-changes-the-game-for-financial-services-10923351.html?zk 
Printable=true (speculating that “Hillary Clinton’s losses in traditionally Democratic states 
like Wisconsin will likely embolden the progressive wing of the party” and observing in 
the immediate aftermath that “Democrats anxious about a Trump victory were calling on 
[Elizabeth] Warren to run for president in 2020”); see also supra note 252. 
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